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NOTES
LOVE THY NEIGHBOR: SHOULD RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATIONS THAT NEGATIVELY

AFFECT COWORKERS' SHIFT PREFERENCES
CONSTITUTE AN UNDUE HARDSHIP ON THE
EMPLOYER UNDER TITLE VII?
Rachel M. Birnbach*
In applying Title VII, courts are often confronted with proposed religious
accommodations that would negatively affect other employees and must
decide whether such an accommodation amounts to an undue hardship on
the employer. However, there is a conflict among circuit courts over the
scope of an employer's duty to accommodate religious employees when
doing so would negatively affect coworkers' scheduling preferences,
outside the context of a collective bargainingagreement. The conflict turns
on whether courts consider any negative impact on coworkers to amount to
impermissible preferential treatment, or whether they require that the
defendant demonstrate a more severe impact on coworkers' rights before
finding that the accommodation would present an undue hardship. This
Note argues thatpreferential treatment of the religious employee exists only
when the proposed accommodation infringes on coworkers' contractually
protected rights, creates an economic burden on the employer, or requires
coworkers to take on additional,physically hazardous tasks.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you manage a pharmacy at a hospital that operates twentyfour hours a day, 365 days a year. Some of your employees have certain
schedules in which they are off from work on Fridays and Saturdays.
During their days off, they may choose to spend time with their spouses,
who also have those days off from work, attend their children's sporting
events, or take care of an ill family member. Imagine further that a new
pharmacist is hired who informs you that his strongly held religious beliefs
and observances require him to observe the Sabbath from Friday sundown
until Saturday sundown, during which he must abstain from doing work.'
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), you are
required to reasonably accommodate the new employee's religious
observances absent undue hardship on the conduct of your business. 2 To do
this, you may have to require other employees to trade shifts with the new
employee, forcing them to work on Friday nights and Saturdays in
exchange for other undesirable shifts off, such as Christmas or
Thanksgiving.
Although the other employees lack contractual rights, such as those
found in a collective bargaining agreement, 3 to their preferred schedules,
they have been working the same shifts for years and have built their
personal lives around their expected schedules. Those employees are
unhappy about having to change shifts and complain that they think it is
unfair that you effectively require them to accommodate the new employee.
Does imposing on these employees and causing them to resent the
accommodation constitute an "undue hardship" excusing you from
accommodating the religious employee? Should you be relieved of the
obligation to accommodate when it causes your longtime employees to feel
mistreated?
The above situation is an increasingly common dilemma for employers
who receive little guidance from courts or the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as to what sorts of accommodations they
4
are required to make that may negatively affect other employees.
1. This fact pattern is borrowed from Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F.2d
141 (5th Cir. 1982).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006).
3. A collective bargaining agreement is a contract between an employer and a labor
union governing the employees' employment conditions including wages, benefits, hours,
and grievances. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 280 (8th ed. 2004). Collective bargaining is the
resolution by employee unions and employers of the problems of the employment
relationship. Such problems include wage rates and systems, hours and overtime, vacations,
seniority, discipline, workloads, classification of employees, layoffs, and worker retirement.
See FRED WITNEY & BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 105 (7th ed. 1996).

4. Between 1992 and 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
saw a one hundred percent increase in religious discrimination charges as well as a
corresponding increase in litigation and inquiries from employers and media regarding
religious discrimination. Gary L. Lieber, United States: EEOC Issues Revamped
Compliance Manual on Title VII Religious Discrimination, MONDAQ, Sept. 24, 2008,

http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=66332.
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Religious employees, also unclear about what sorts of accommodations
they are entitled to, have increasingly resorted to litigation alleging that
their employers, or prospective employers, have failed to accommodate
5
their religious needs as required by law.
As previously mentioned, Title VII does not require religious
accommodation if it would cause an "undue hardship" on the employer's
business conduct. 6 The EEOC guidelines explaining the accommodation
duty also only refer to undue hardships on the employer's business and do
7
not mention hardships stemming from negative effects on other employees.
8
Yet the U.S. Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
seemed to suggest that an accommodation that treated the religious
employee preferentially at the expense of his coworkers could amount to an
undue hardship. 9 The U.S. courts of appeals are split over just what level of
negative effects on other employees resulting from an accommodation
amounts to such barred preferential treatment.' 0
According to some courts, giving a religious employee shift priority at
the expense of nonreligious employees would amount to preferential
treatment, placing an undue hardship on the employer and relieving him of
the duty to accommodate. 1 ' In contrast, other courts require a higher
degree of negative impact on coworkers before they consider differential
treatment of religious employees to be preferential. These courts find that
although an employee is treated differently, he is not necessarily being
treated preferentially, suggesting that requiring the employer in the
hypothetical to accommodate the new employee would therefore be
reasonable. 12
This Note argues against those courts that have found that imposing on
shift preferences of coworkers outside the context of a collective bargaining
agreement amounts to preferential treatment. It asserts that protecting the
mere shift preferences of other workers effectively reduces the duty to
accommodate to a level far below what Congress could have intended when
5. In 2007, 2880 complaints of religious discrimination were filed with the EEOC. See
Emily Bazar, PrayerLeads to Disputes in Workplace, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 2008, at 3A

(discussing Muslim factory workers' religious accommodation claims).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
7. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2
(2008); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
8. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
9. See infra Part I.E. The U.S. Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,

432 U.S. 63 (1977), did not explicitly hold that preferential treatment is tantamount to undue
hardship. However, lower courts have interpreted the Hardison Court's seeming unease
with preferential treatment as an indication that such treatment is barred. See, e.g., Weber v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000); Aron v. Quest Diagnostics Inc.,
No. Civ.A.03-2581 JSH, 2005 WL 1541060, at *6-7 (D.N.J. June 30, 2005). The Hardison

dissent also viewed the majority opinion as barring preferential treatment. Taking this as the
standard, the presence of undue hardship hinges on courts' understanding of preferential
treatment. See Hardison,432 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10. See infra Part II.A-B.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
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it included the duty to accommodate religious employees under Title VII.
Since every accommodation of an employee's religious needs potentially
requires differential treatment, it is necessary to have a higher threshold for
impact on other employees that can constitute employer hardship.
Part I of this Note discusses the genesis of the religious accommodation
requirement and compares religion as a protected class under Title VII with
other protected classes. Part I then details the path that failure-toaccommodate claims take through the EEOC and to the courts. Finally, it
explores the case law that has defined the scope of an employer's duty to
reasonably accommodate a religious employee absent undue hardship,
focusing on cases in which proposed accommodations would negatively
impact other employees. Part II of this Note analyzes courts' differing
interpretations of when an accommodation's imposition on coworkers' shift
preferences amounts to preferential treatment and an undue hardship on the
employer. Part III of this Note concludes that preferential treatment of the
religious employee exists only when imposition on the coworkers infringes
on their rights, creates an economic burden on the employer, or requires
coworkers to take on additional physically dangerous tasks.
I. PROTECTION AFFORDED FOR RELIGIOUS OBSERVERS: BACKGROUND OF
TITLE VII'S RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENT

Concentrating on courts' differing interpretations of when an
accommodation's impact on coworkers' shift preferences amounts to
preferential treatment of a religious employee, this Part first details the
history of an employer's obligation to reasonably accommodate a religious
employee absent undue hardship. Next, it compares religion with other
protected classes under Title VII. Then, it discusses the path that a religious
employee's claim of discrimination must make through the EEOC to the
courts. Finally, this Part surveys the case law that has defined the scope of
an employer's accommodation obligation, focusing on its application to
accommodations that negatively impact other employees.
A. The History of the Employer's Duty To Reasonably Accommodate a
Religious Employee Absent Undue Hardship
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was forged in an atmosphere of great
urgency. 13
Mounting unrest, pervasive racial discrimination, and
segregation exposed during the 1960s outraged Americans and tarnished
America's image abroad. 14 On June 19, 1963, during the height of the civil
rights protests and demonstrations, President John F. Kennedy sent

13. See EEOC, Pre 1965:
Events Leading to the Creation of EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/pre1965/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
14. Id.
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comprehensive civil rights legislation to Congress. 15
After fierce
16
opposition in Congress, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed.
Title VII, one part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, proscribes
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin. 17 It applies to employers with fifteen or more employees,
including state and local governments, employment agencies, labor
organizations, and the federal government. 18 The Civil Rights Act also
established the EEOC, an agency formed to receive, investigate, and
conciliate employment
discrimination complaints but which lacks any
19
enforcement power.
Originally, Title VII provided solely for equal treatment in
employment.2 0 Its goal was to eliminate status-based discrimination: that
is, discrimination based on an individual's status as a member of a protected
class. 2 1 However, in the two years following the passage of Title VII, the
EEOC had received several complaints from a number of religious
employees claiming that their employers were refusing to allow them to
take time off during the workweek to observe holy days. 22 Due to these
complaints, the EEOC adopted guidelines that required an employer to
make reasonable accommodation for religious employees absent "serious
inconvenience" on the employer's business. 23 In 1968, the Guidelines were
amended to replace the term "serious inconvenience" with "undue
24
hardship."
Despite the EEOC guidelines calling for religious accommodation,
before 1972, courts interpreted Title VII's prohibition of discrimination
based on religion merely to mean treating employees the same way without
15. Id.
16. Id.; see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as

amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6
(2006)).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) states,

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
18. See EEOC, Religious Discrimination, http://eeoc.gov/types/religion.html (last visited
Oct. 28, 2009).
19. See EEOC, supra note 13.
20. See Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson 's Choice Model for
Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 473 (2006).
21. See James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The Workplace
Religious Freedom Act of 2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 Souls, 79 NOTRE

DAME L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2004) (noting that Congress included religion among the
prohibited forms of "status" discrimination without any legislative history to determine
whether it considered religion as an immutable characteristic).
22. See Thomas D. Brierton, "Reasonable Accommodation'" Under Title VII: Is It
Reasonable to the Religious Employee?, 42 CATH. LAW. 165, 167 (2002); see also 29 C.F.R.

§ 1605.1(a) (1967).
23. See Brierton, supra note 22, at 167-68; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967).
24. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967), with 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1968).
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regard to their religion. 25 However, after Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co. 26
and Riley v. Bendix Corp.,2 7 in which courts held-and the Supreme Court
later affirmed-that requiring all employees to work on Sunday was not
discriminatory because it was applicable to all employees without regard to
religion, 2 8 Congress amended Title VII.
Senator Jennings Randolph, a Seventh-Day Baptist who observed
Saturday Sabbath, 29 proposed an amendment to Title VII that would codify
the accommodation obligation set forth in the EEOC guidelines and
overturn Dewey and Riley. 30
Congress overwhelmingly passed the
amendment, and included the Dewey and Riley opinions in the legislative
history as examples of judicial reasoning that the amendment was intended
to overturn. 3 1 The statute in its current form requires employers to
"reasonably accommodate... an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice" unless doing so would be an "undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. '32 Thus, Title VII now

25. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 335-36 (6th Cir. 1970), affid by
an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam); see also Brierton, supra note 22,
at 169 (noting that prior to the 1972 amendment courts "refused to fully recognize the 1967
EEOC guidelines because they fell outside the literal language of Title VII"); Steven D.
Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A PrincipledApproach to Title VII and Religious
Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 719, 741 (1996); Prenkert & Magid, supra note 20, at
474-75.
26. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
27. 330 F. Supp. 583, 589 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
28. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 328-29; Riley, 330 F. Supp. at 589; see also Karen Engle, The
Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision To
Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REv. 317, 363 (1997) (noting that the Senate ordered Riley v.
Bendix Corp. and Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co. to be printed in the CongressionalRecord
just before amending Title VII). Additionally, the 1966 EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Religion were entered into the record. See 118 CONG. REc. 706-14 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Randolph).
29. See Brierton, supra note 22, at 169. In the congressional hearings for the proposed
amendment to Title VII, Senator Randolph stated,
There are approximately 750,000 men and women who are Orthodox Jews in the
U.S. work force who fall in this category of persons I am discussing. There are an
additional 425,000 men and women in the work force who are Seventh-day
Adventists .... [T]here has been a partial refusal at times on the part of
employers to hire or to continue in employment employees whose religious
practices rigidly require them to abstain from work ...on particular days.
118 CONG. REC. 705.
30. See 118 CONG. REc. 705-06; see also Prenkert & Magid, supra note 20, at 476 n.34
(noting that Senator Randolph viewed the amendment not as changing the meaning of Title
VII, but instead as "correct[ing] the erroneous interpretation by several courts of Title VII's
prohibition of religious discrimination" (citing 118 CONG. REc. 705-06)).
31. See Prenkert & Magid, supra note 20, at 474.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006) (stating that the definition of religion is "all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief," and that an employer has a duty of
reasonable accommodation of employees' religion); see also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 63 n.1 (1986) (noting that "[t]he reasonable accommodation duty
was incorporated into the statute, somewhat awkwardly, in the definition of religious
practice"); Kent Greenawalt, Title VII andReligious Liberty, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (2001)
(noting that § 2000e(j) is oddly crafted as a definition of religion).
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protects both membership in a particular religion as well as the conduct
33
necessary to observe that religion.
However, the 1972 amendment to Title VII was hastily passed and
provided little indication of what was considered a "reasonable
accommodation" or an "undue hardship," and courts have since been
struggling with the meaning of these terms. 34 The legislative record,
however, does indicate that the language of the amendment was intended to
provide a flexible approach to accommodation issues and that, to some
degree, courts and the EEOC were intended to have discretion in
determining whether a religious observer's needs were being unreasonably
35
interfered with.
B. Religion Compared with Other Protected Classes Under Title VII
The common perception of "antidiscrimination" in the United States is
that differential treatment of individuals on the basis of protected
characteristics beyond their control is prohibited. 36 However, Title VII
protects both mutable and immutable characteristics. At first glance, it may
seem anomalous that religion is a protected class under Title VI-religion
is a trait that is directly within one's control, whereas race or gender is
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (protecting religious observance and belief as well as
membership in a particular religious group); see also Engle, supra note 28, at 369-72
(arguing that the 1972 amendment collapsed religious status and conduct, making them
indistinguishable).
34. See Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII's Failure To Provide Meaningful and Consistent
Protection of Religious Employees: Proposalsfor an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 575, 584 (2000) (noting that many commentators have suggested there is a lack of
helpful legislative history of the 1972 amendment, which makes determining the meaning of
"reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" difficult); James M. Oleske, Jr.,
Federalism,Free Exercise, and Title VII Reconsidering Reasonable Accommodation, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 525, 532-35 (2004); Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer's Duty
To Accommodate Employee Religious Practices Under Title VII After Ansonia Board of
Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. PrrT. L. REV. 513, 516-17 (1989) ("Although [§ 2000e(j) was]
enacted to clarify the nature of the employer's duty under Title VII, the amendment did not
provide guidance with respect to three significant issues: 1) the definition and scope of
reasonable accommodation; 2) the definition and scope of undue hardship; and 3) the
relationship between reasonable accommodation and undue hardship." (footnotes omitted));
cf Aron v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., No. Civ.A.03-2581 JSH, 2005 WL 1541060, at *7
(D.N.J. June 30, 2005) (discussing undue hardship with reference to the reasonableness of an
accommodation).
35. See 118 CONG. REc. 706 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph); see also Ansonia, 479
U.S. at 69 (noting that Senator Randolph expressed his hope that accommodations "would be
made with 'flexibility' and 'a desire to achieve an adjustment' (quoting 118 CONG. REC.
706)); id. at 73 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part); Zablotsky, supra note 34, at 553 (noting that
the legislative history of the amendment to § 701(j) calls for "flexibility"). The specific
context of Senator Randolph's remarks suggests that he was "concerned with providing the
EEOC with flexibility and discretion when evaluating claims of religious discrimination and
determining satisfaction by employers of the duty to accommodate." Zablotsky, supra note
34, at 553-54.
36. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscriminationand Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642,
643 (2001); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances:
The Logic of American
AntidiscriminationLaw, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000).
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immutable. 37

Although

prejudice

based

on

immutable

characteristics, like race or sex, seems particularly unfair, American
antidiscrimination law also prohibits discrimination based on mutable traits,

which may be equally unfair. 38 Religion is protected, although it is a trait

within an individual's control, in part because many find the idea of
requiring one to choose between a job and one's religious beliefs
nation's history of
pernicious, 39 especially within the context of the
40
protecting religious freedom as a fundamental right.
Title VII's prohibition on religious discrimination incorporates protection

for both the status of being a member of a particular religion and the
conduct of observing a particular religion, requiring employers to pay

special attention to the religious needs of their employees. 41 In contrast,
protection from discrimination based on birthright-such

as gender,

national origin, or race-only considers the status of being in a particular
group4 2 and requires employers to treat such status as irrelevant in
employment decisions and treatment. 4 3 Thus, nondiscrimination based on

religion requires an employer to treat employees differently in order to
or
accommodate their religious needs, whereas protection based on gender
44
race requires employers to treat members of such groups neutrally.
Some commentators argue that the religious accommodation duty not

only requires different treatment but also may require the employer to
discriminate in favor of certain employees by granting religious employees

37. See Post, supra note 36, at 8 (noting that discrimination based on traits under an
individual's control, such as religion or marital status, are protected by antidiscrimination
laws); cf Engle, supra note 28, at 359 (arguing that a reason for the different treatment of
religion under Title VII compared with other protected characteristics "might be that religion
just feels different from the other categories in that it seems both compelled and voluntary
and that it is largely about observance").
38. Post, supra note 36, at 8-9.
39. As was eloquently noted by the dissenting Justices in Hardison, "a society that truly
values religious pluralism cannot compel adherents of minority religions to make the cruel
choice of surrendering their religion or their job." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 87 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf Engle, supra note 28, at 380-81;
Prenkert & Magid, supra note 20, at 468 n.5, 513-14.
40. See Michael D. Moberly, Bad News for Those Proclaimingthe Good News?: The
Employer's Ambiguous Duty To Accommodate Religious Proselytizing, 42 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (2001); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Amish
children could not be placed under compulsory education past eighth grade, as it violated
their parents' fundamental right to freedom of religion).
41. See Engle, supra note 28, at 369-72.
42. For instance, an employer's no-braided-hair policy is not considered discriminatory
under Title VII to African-American women who have braided hair. See Engle, supra note
28, at 329-30 (citing Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
43. See Engle, supra note 28, at 327-28. Professor Robert Post argues that, in the
context of gender and race discrimination, American antidiscrimination law forces
employers to treat their employees as if they did not display "socially powerful and salient
attributes, because these attributes may induce irrational and prejudiced judgments." Post,
supra note 36, at 11- 12.
44. See Engle, supra note 28, at 327, 369-72.
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special treatment because of their religious practices. 45 However, courts
often reject the idea of requiring unequal or preferential treatment of
religious employees and hold that an employer is only required to
accommodate by allowing differential treatment of religious employees, not
special or preferential treatment. 4 6 This distinction may be due to courts'
wariness of anything resembling discriminatory treatment, stemming from
purpose of Title VII is to
the "canonical idea" that the antidiscriminatory
47
provide neutral, not unequal, treatment.
C. ProceduralPrerequisitesto Religious Discrimination Claims
When an employee believes that she has suffered employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII, she cannot go directly to court.
Instead, she must first go through the EEOC's processes intended to resolve
many employment disputes before they reach the courts. 48 The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 established the EEOC, an administrative agency dealing solely
with employment discrimination claims. 49 The EEOC officially began
operations on July 2, 1965, one year after the passage of the Act. 50 The
agency enforces federal laws that prohibit employment discrimination
including Title VII, 5 1 the Equal Pay Act of 1963,52 the Age Discrimination
45. See Jamar, supra note 25, at 742; cf Nantiya Ruan, Accommodating Respectful
Religious Expression in the Workplace, 92 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 16 (2008).
46. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1996);
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 1979); O'Brien v. City of Springfield, 319 F.
Supp. 2d 90, 108 (D. Mass. 2003).
It should be noted that some observers do not consider an employer's obligation to
accommodate religious employees as falling under the legal category of
"antidiscrimination." See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 36, at 643. Professor Christine Jolls
contrasts the accommodation requirement with typical antidiscrimination enactments, which
focus on "equal," not "special" treatment of employees. Id. at 643-44. Jolls succinctly notes
how accommodation differs from antidiscrimination in that the "canonical idea of
'antidiscrimination' in the United States condemns the differential treatment of otherwise
similarly situated individuals," whereas accommodation seems to require it. Id. at 643 (citing
Post, supra note 36, at 9-12).
47. See Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 20 ("[Jludges have generally been very resistant to
claims of accommodation and hesitant to require employers to deviate from neutral rules of
general application." (citing Engle, supra note 28, at 392-406)); Jolls, supra note 36, at 698
(arguing that certain categories of antidiscrimination law, in particular the disparate impact
branch, overlap with the accommodation category, which is traditionally thought of as a
separate aspect of employment discrimination law); Debbie N. Kaminer, When Religious
Expression Creates a Hostile Work Environment: The Challenge of Balancing Competing
FundamentalRights, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 81, 99 (2000); Kaminer, supra note
34, at 579 ("Th[e] discomfort [with requiring religious accommodation] can also be
explained by the fact that courts are generally reluctant to require differential or preferential
treatment based on any of the protected categories under Title VII.").
48. See generally EEOC, EEOC's Charge Processing Procedure, http://eeoc.gov/
charge/overview..charge.processing.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006); see also EEOC, supra note 13.
50. EEOC, 1965-1971: A "Toothless Tiger" Helps Shape the Law and Educate the
Public, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1965-7 l/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin).
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in Employment Act of 1967, 53 Title I and Title V of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 54 sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 55 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.56 Although it lacks the power to

make binding determinations, all laws enforced by the EEOC, except the
Equal Pay Act, require filing a charge with EEOC before a private lawsuit
may be filed in court. 57 This section will focus primarily on the procedure
that an employee complaining of religious discrimination must follow to
pursue her claim under Title VII, although the procedure is virtually the
same for individuals complaining of discrimination based on Title VII's
other protected traits.
Individuals filing charges for discrimination on the basis of religion can
allege that their employer has treated them differently based on their
religion, failed to accommodate their sincerely held religious belief, or
refused to allow their religious expression in the workplace. 5 8 Over the last
decade, the number of charges of religious discrimination that the EEOC
has received has almost doubled. 59 In 1997, the EEOC received 1709
charges of religious discrimination, and it resolved 2137.60 But in 2008, the
EEOC received 3273 charges of religious discrimination, and it resolved
2727.61 In 2008, it recovered $7.5 million in monetary benefits for
aggrieved individuals, compared with just $2.2 6million
in 1997, not
2
including monetary relief obtained through litigation.
The first step for an individual who believes that her employment rights
have been violated is filing a complaint, called a charge, of discrimination
with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged violation. 63 Once an
individual files a charge with the EEOC, the employer is notified that the
charge has been filed and the EEOC will begin its investigation. 64 The
52. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006))
(protecting men and women who perform substantially equal work in the same establishment
from sex-based wage discrimination).
53. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634)
(protecting individuals who are 40 years of age or older from discrimination in employment
based on their age).
54. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213) (prohibiting employment discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities
in the private sector, and in state and local governments).
55. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 791)
(prohibiting discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities who work in the
federal government).
56. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981)
(providing monetary damages in cases of intentional employment discrimination).
57. See EEOC, Filing a Charge of Employment Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/
charge/overview charge-filing.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
58. See EEOC, supra note 18.
59. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
60. See EEOC, Religion-Based Charges FY 1997-FY 2008, http://eeoc.gov/stats/
religion.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See EEOC, supra note 57.
64. See EEOC, supra note 48.
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EEOC can seek to settle a charge at any point in the investigation if the
aggrieved employee-referred to as the charging party-and the employer
express an interest in pursuing settlement. 65 A charge may also be selected
for mediation if both the charging party and the employer express an
66
interest in this option.
A charge may be dismissed at any point if, in the EEOC's judgment,
further investigation will not establish a violation of the law. 67 When a
charge is dismissed, the EEOC issues a "right to sue" letter, which gives the
charging party ninety days to file a private lawsuit in court. 68
If the investigation produces evidence that establishes that a violation of
the law has occurred, the EEOC will inform the employer and the charging
party of its findings and then will attempt conciliation with the employer to
develop a remedy for the discrimination. 69 If the case is successfully
conciliated, or if a case has been successfully mediated or settled earlier,
neither the EEOC nor the charging party may file suit in court70 unless the
conciliation, mediation, or settlement agreement is not honored.
If a violation of the employment discrimination laws is found and the
EEOC is unable to successfully conciliate the case, the agency will decide
whether to bring suit in federal court. 7 1 If the EEOC decides not to sue on
the plaintiffs behalf, it will issue a notice closing the case and giving the
charging party ninety days in which to file a lawsuit on his or her own
72
behalf.
Claims of religious discrimination reach federal court when the EEOC
files suit on the employee's behalf, when an aggrieved employee receives a
"right to sue" letter from the EEOC as mentioned above, or if the employee
requests a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC 180 days after the charge was
first filed with the EEOC. 73 If the EEOC issues a right to sue letter, the
employee then has ninety days to bring suit after receiving the letter. 74 The
cases this Note discusses infra all began with EEOC charges and followed
one of these paths to federal court.
D. Prima Facie "FailureTo Accommodate" Claim
Once a plaintiff has fulfilled the procedural prerequisites, she must still
carry her burden of proof in court. 75 To do this, the plaintiff must show that
her employer failed to "reasonably accommodate" her religious needs or

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

74. Id.
75. See supra Part I.C.
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observances. 7 6 To avoid liability, the employer must then demonstrate that
accommodating the plaintiff would result in an "undue hardship" to the
77
employer's business.
Courts agree that to establish a prima facie failure-to-accommodate
claim, a plaintiff must show
(1) that an employment policy conflicts with an employee's religious
practice; (2) that the religious practice is required by the employee's bona
fide religious belief; (3) that the employer has been made aware of the
conflict; and (4) that the employee has been refused employment or
otherwise suffered adverse consequences
because of his noncompliance
78
with the employer's requirement.
Once the plaintiff presents her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer. 79 At this point, the employer must show either (1) that a
reasonable accommodation was presented to the employee or (2) that the
employer was unable to reasonably accommodate the employee's religious
practices without enduring an undue hardship on the conduct of the
80
employer's business.
Title VII itself, however, provides no guidance for deciding when a
reasonable accommodation has been offered or what accommodations
amount to undue hardships. 81 Courts have, therefore, largely been left to
determine the scope of the accommodation obligation unaided by legislative
expression.
E. The Current Understandingof the "Undue Hardship" Standard
As previously mentioned, Title VII does not define what constitutes an
"undue hardship." 82 To delineate the meaning of the term, the Supreme
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006).
77. Id.
78. Jamar, supra note 25, at 743; see also EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859
F.2d 610, 614 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988).
79. See Jamar, supra note 25, at 743; see also Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390
F.3d 126, 133-34 (1st Cir. 2004); Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir.
1996); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 144 (5th Cir. 1982); Jackson v. Bob
Evans-Columbus, No. 2:04cv559, 2006 WL 3814099, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2006);
Aron v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., No. Civ.A.03-2581 JSH, 2005 WL 1541060, at *3 (D.N.J.
June 30, 2005). McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), first articulated
the burden-shifting analysis used by many courts in failure-to-accommodate claims;
however, that case was a race discrimination claim brought under Title VII. Id. at 794-96.
80. See Jamar, supra note 25, at 743.
81. Courts and commentators often note that the legislative history of Title VII is also of
"little assistance" in interpreting § 2000e(j). See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 74 (1977); Kaminer, supra note 34, at 589; Zablotsky, supra note 34, at 534-35
n.70; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text. But see Hardison, 432 U.S. at 88-90
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court seems almost oblivious of the legislative history of
the 1972 amendments to Title VII ....

That history is far more instructive than the Court

allows.").
82. See MICHAEL WOLF, BRUCE FRIEDMAN & DANIEL SUTHERLAND, RELIGION IN THE
WORKPLACE: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 104 (1998);
Prenkert & Magid, supra note 20, at 480 ("The statute itself provides no guidance for
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Court decided Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,8 3 its first decision
dealing with the undue hardship standard and the current controlling
authority on the issue. As explained in further detail later in this section,
however, 84 Hardison has only somewhat defined "undue hardship," and
lower courts have continued to be unsure of the precise meaning of the
85
term.
Part I.E explores the employer's obligation to reasonably accommodate a
religious employee, focusing on the current understanding of the undue
hardship standard. First, this section summarizes the facts and holdings of
Hardison. Next, it outlines the two methods by which an employer can
demonstrate undue hardship and explains how these two methods were
integral to the Hardison decision. Finally, it outlines three cases that are
useful in further understanding the employer's accommodation obligation.
1. Facts of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
The facts of Hardison are typical of many "failure to accommodate"
claims. Larry Hardison, a Saturday Sabbath observer and member of the
Worldwide Church of God, worked for Trans World Airlines (TWA) in the
stores department, which was open twenty-four hours per day, every day of
the year. 86 The employees who worked at this facility were subject to a
seniority system, contained in their collective bargaining agreement, 87
differentiating reasonable from unreasonable accommodations, nor does it define what
experiences involved in providing an accommodation are hardships, let alone undue
hardships."); see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
83. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
84. See infra notes 110-13, 122-28 and accompanying text; see also Part I.E. 1.
85. Although the Supreme Court has defined "undue hardship" as more than a de
minimis burden, courts have continued to be unsure of what types of burdens are de minimis.
Hardison,432 U.S. at 84-85 (holding that an employer is not required to bear more than a de
minimis burden in accommodating a religious employee); see also Engle, supra note 28, at
390 (noting that the Court in Hardison gave little guidance as to when an accommodation
could ever be required but gave many suggestions as to when it could not be required);
Kaminer, supra note 34, at 596 (arguing that lower courts have followed the Supreme
Court's overall narrow interpretation of § 2000e(j), which has led to conflicting views
regarding the appropriate scope of accommodation obligation). See generally infra Part II.
Courts are even less clear as to what types of religious accommodations are considered
"reasonable" under Title VII and most concede that the determination of reasonable
accommodation is typically a case-by-case analysis. See Beadle v. Hillsborough County
Sheriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (1 1th Cir. 1994); United States v. City of Albuquerque,
545 F.2d 110, 114 (10th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of the different approaches to the
"undue hardship" analysis see infra Part I.E.2.
86. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 66.
87. Id. at 67. Employees earn seniority status based on length of service at their
employer. See George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair
Employment Laws: A GeneralApproach to Objective Criteriaof Hiring and Promotion, 82
HARV. L. REv. 1598, 1602 (1969).
Employees with greater seniority gain preferred
treatment with respect to certain employment decisions, such as scheduling and promotion,
in relation to less senior employees. Id.; BENJAMIN WOLKINSON & MSU EMPLOYMENT LAW
GROUP, EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE WORKPLACE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS 150

(2d ed. 2008). Typically, seniority systems exist in collective bargaining agreements and
result from negotiations between unions and employers. See Berta E. Hernandez, Title VII v.
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which allowed the most senior employees to have first choice in scheduling
shifts. 88 Under this system, Hardison was able to avoid working on his
Sabbath, but when his request to move to a different building within TWA
was granted, he lacked sufficient seniority to avoid being scheduled to work
on Saturday. 89 When Hardison's union refused to violate the collective
bargaining agreement to accommodate Hardison's religious needs,
Hardison was scheduled to work on a Saturday. 90 9He
refused to work on
1
his Sabbath and was discharged for insubordination.
Hardison sued, claiming that TWA violated Title VII and discriminated
against him on the basis of religion by failing to accommodate his religious
needs. 92 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and found that TWA did not violate Title
V11.

93

The Hardison Court held that an accommodation would subject an
employer to an undue hardship if the employer was required to bear more
95
than a "de minimis" 94 cost in accommodating a religious employee.
However, as discussed in Part I.E.2.b, this case is also often cited for the
proposition that an employer can demonstrate an undue hardship by
showing that a religious accommodation would negatively affect the
religious employee's coworkers, treating the religious employee

Seniority: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away, 35 AM. U. L.
REv. 339, 343 (1986). However, some seniority systems are devised by employers
unilaterally and are not part of any collective bargaining agreement. See U.S. Airways, Inc.
v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403-04 (2002); Linda Greenhouse, Seniority Upheld Against
DisabilityRights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at A20. Regardless of its source, however, an
employer is not required to breach a bona fide seniority system to accommodate a religious
employee. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006). Although not all seniority systems are
contractually enforceable, all of the cases discussed in this Note where seniority rights were
at issue involved seniority systems that were incorporated within the applicable collective
bargaining agreement and, thus, amounted to contractual rights for the employees.
88. Hardison,432 U.S. at 67.
89. Id. at 68.
90. Id. at 69.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 70.
94. The term "de minimis" is defined as "1. Trifling; minimal. 2. (Of a fact or thing) so
insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 464; see infra Part I.E.2.a; see also Cloutier v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 134 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that a hardship may be undue if
it would result in "economic costs, such as lost business or having to hire additional
employees to accommodate" a religious employee).
95. Hardison,432 U.S. at 84.
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preferentially. 96 Thus, two possible ways of demonstrating undue hardship
97
have emerged from lower courts' interpretation of Hardison.
2. The Two Methods of Demonstrating Undue Hardship
As previously mentioned, there are two methods by which an employer
98
can show that an accommodation would result in an undue hardship.
First, undue hardship can be demonstrated by showing an accommodation
would cause a financial hardship that is more than de minimis. 99 An
employer may also prove that an accommodation would result 10in0
preferential treatment of the religious employee over her coworkers.
This Note refers to the first method of demonstrating undue hardship as
"Financial Cost Hardship" and to the second as "Preferential Treatment
Hardship."''
Today, the current understanding of the undue hardship
standard is still primarily defined by Hardison, which involved Financial
03
Cost Hardship10 2 and, implicitly, Preferential Treatment Hardship.
In demonstrating undue hardship by either method, courts typically hold
that a hardship needs to be more than merely speculative to relieve the
employer of its duty to accommodate. 10 4 Some courts, however, hold that
an employer is not required to endure the hardship to claim that it has been

96. See infra Part I.E.2.b; see also Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 338 (8th Cir.
1992); Turpen v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984); Tooley v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981); Yott v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp.,
602 F.2d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 1979); Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.
1978).
97. See Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 134-35 (noting two possible ways of demonstrating
hardship); Kalsi v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(stating that an employer can show undue hardship by showing either that an
accommodation's "'impact on co-workers or its cost would be more than de minimis'
(quoting Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984))); see also
EEOC, supra note 18.
98. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
100. See infra Part I.E.2.b; see also Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 134 (noting that noneconomic
costs may amount to an undue hardship); EEOC, supra note 18.
101. See infra Part I.E.2.a-b.
102. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
103. See id. at 81-83.
104. See Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 135 ("Courts are 'somewhat skeptical of hypothetical
hardships that an employer thinks might be caused by an accommodation that never has been
put into practice."' (quoting Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.
1975))); Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1999); see also
Kaminer, supra note 34, at 611 ("Many courts agree that an employer must establish that it
will suffer an actual undue hardship in accommodating a religious employee, and that
speculative or hypothetical hardships do not constitute undue hardship."); WOLF ET AL.,
supra note 82, at 108. However, there are at least a few cases that support the proposition
that a hypothetical hardship can constitute undue hardship. See Weber v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2000); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 560
F.2d 579, 583 n.22 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Cloutier,390 F.3d at 135.
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unduly burdened and instead can show evidence that such a hardship would
10 5
in fact occur if the employer was required to accommodate the employee.
Using Hardison as a paradigm, this section first discusses Financial Cost
Hardship. Next, it examines Preferential Treatment Hardship and explains
how it was integral to Hardison'sdisposition.
a. The FirstMethod: FinancialCost Hardship
To demonstrate "Financial Cost Hardship," an employer must show that
accommodating the religious employee would result in an economic cost,
10 6
including lost efficiency, to the conduct of the employer's business.
Relying on the Hardison holding that any cost that is more than de minimis
is an undue hardship, 10 7 courts tend to find that virtually any economic cost
to an employer is an undue hardship. 108 In these cases, unless an
105. See EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 317 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citing Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995)) (noting that the undue
hardship determination cannot be based on speculation, but an employer is not required to
wait until it feels the effects of the accommodation before determining that it constitutes an
[I]t is possible for an employer to prove undue
undue hardship); Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 135 (."
hardship without actually having undertaken any of the possible accommodations ... '
(quoting Draper, 527 F.2d at 520)); see also Prenkert & Magid, supra note 20, at 469-70
(noting that in religious expression-proselytization cases, courts have expanded the undue
hardship defense to allow employers' speculation regarding the harm resulting from
accommodating proselytizing to amount to an undue hardship).
106. See Sara L. Silbiger, Heaven Can Wait: Judicial Interpretation of Title VII's
Religious Accommodation Requirement Since Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 839, 857-59 (1985); see also Kaminer, supra note 34, at 614; EEOC,
supra note 18.
107. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84. In addition to spending money to accommodate a
religious employee, breaching a contract or collective bargaining agreement would also
inflict harm on a business. WOLF ET AL., supra note 82, at 110-11.
108. See, e.g., Hardison, 432 U.S. at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that
stipulations make clear that the accommodation would have cost TWA $150 for three
months of overtime, at which time Hardison would have been eligible under the seniority
system to transfer back to his previous department where accommodation would no longer
be an issue); Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that administrative
costs involved in transferring religious employee to another facility constituted undue
hardship); EEOC v. BJ Servs. Co., 921 F. Supp. 1509, 1514 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that
monetary cost of transferring an equipment operator from another location was one of the
bases for finding an undue hardship); Gibson v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 620 F. Supp. 85, 86-87 (E.D.
Ark. 1985) (stating that employee's refusal to work on Saturdays constituted undue hardship
because it would require employer to incur additional cost of $240 for overtime); Prenkert &
Magid, supra note 20, at 468; Ruan, supra note 45, at 17; Zablotsky, supra note 34, at 547.
But see Jolls, supra note 36, at 686; Kaminer, supra note 34, at 614 (arguing that because
courts have not specifically articulated a rule that an accommodation requiring financial cost
always constitutes undue hardship, the door has been left open so that in the future, some
economic cost could be required); WOLF ET AL., supra note 82, at 130 ("Administrative costs
expended by employers to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs are usually viewed
as de minimis."). Professor Jolls argues that sometimes an employer may be injured
financially by complying with even neutral rules of antidiscrimination-i.e., the prohibition
on intentional discrimination-such as when an employer must hire women, for example,
even though the employer is aware that its customers would be highly reluctant to work with
a woman. Jolls, supra note 36, at 686. Jolls concludes that "even those aspects of
antidiscrimination law that prohibit intentional discrimination... require employers to bear
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accommodation can be reached that does not require any financial cost,
to find that an employer did not meet
courts have been extremely unwilling
09
obligation.1
accommodation
its
In Hardison, TWA clearly demonstrated Financial Cost Hardship. The
Hardison Court found that Hardison's request to have Saturdays off so he
could observe the Sabbath would be an undue hardship on his employer
because TWA would be required to breach the seniority system, in
contravention of its agreement with Hardison's union, and, to do so, it
would be required to pay premium overtime hours to other employees.110
The Supreme Court emphasized that Title VII did not require an
employer to violate a valid seniority system to accommodate a religious

real financial costs associated with a particular group of employees and, in this respect, to
'accommodate' those employees," thus suggesting that the line between accommodation
rules and neutrality rules of antidiscrimination is not all that clear. Id. at 698.
109. Zablotsky, supra note 34, at 544-51. A possible reason why courts have been
reluctant to require employers to incur any expense to accommodate religious employees is
the potential violation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution's First Amendment.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .. "). Litigants have sometimes argued that § 2000e(j) is unconstitutional as a
violation of the Establishment Clause; however, courts of appeals have uniformly rejected
such challenges. Oleske, supra note 34, at 537; see EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., 849 F.2d 116,
119 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding that Title VII poses no constitutional problem and
noting that "[e]very court of appeals that has addressed this issue has held that [the
accommodation provision] does not violate the First Amendment"); Protos v. Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648
F.2d 1239, 1244-46 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that Title VII does not violate the
Establishment Clause). See generally Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 22 ("Enough cases have
been decided since Hardison to give us reasonable assurance that requiring minimal cost
accommodation is constitutionally permissible. But, that conclusion leaves open the issue of
whether requiring more costly accommodations might violate the Establishment Clause.").
The Bureau of National Affairs handbook Religious Accommodation in the Workplace
suggests that the Supreme Court's opinion in Hardison avoided the constitutional issue by
setting "a very low standard of what the statute could require." BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS,
A LEGAL AND PRACTICAL
INC., RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN THE WORKPLACE:
HANDBOOK 42 (1987) [hereinafter BNA HANDBOOK]. Commentators have also argued that
the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the duty to reasonably accommodate a religious
employee due to First Amendment concerns. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen,
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (1996)
("Apparently to avoid constitutional questions under the Establishment Clause, the Supreme
Court interpreted the duty of reasonable accommodation narrowly ....); Prenkert & Magid,
supra note 20, at 482 ("[S]ome of the Court's language hinted that it carefully balanced Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns."); Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of
Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1695 (1988) ("The Court has
construed the 'reasonable accommodation' requirement narrowly, allowing it to avoid ruling
on the provision's constitutionality.").
However, Professor Karen Engle notes that although commentators often make the claim
that Hardison construed the duty to accommodate narrowly to avoid the constitutional issue,
no support is cited for the proposition and the Hardison Court did not offer the
Establishment Clause as a reason for its decision. Engle, supra note 28, at 402 & n.373
(arguing that courts have "not consider[ed] the Establishment Clause as an obstacle to
accommodation"). For a more detailed discussion of the Title VII religious accommodation
duty and its constitutional implications, see Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 22.
110. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 76-77.
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employee, as doing so would be a burden on the employer."' The Court
held that "requir[ing] TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to
give Hardison Saturdays off [was] an undue hardship." 1 2 The Court also
noted that the operation of the seniority system itself "represented a
significant accommodation to the needs, both religious and secular, of all of
TWA's employees... [and was] a neutral way of minimizing the number
of occasions when an employee must work on a day that he would prefer to
113
have off."
b. The Second Method of Showing Undue Hardship: Preferential
Treatment Hardship
In addition to the holding that an employer is not required to breach a
bona fide seniority system 1 4 or bear a financial cost in accommodating a
religious employee, 115 lower courts have identified another principle in the
Hardison decision. 116 Courts have read Hardison to hold that an undue
hardship can be found where an accommodation requires preferential
17
treatment of a religious employee over her coworkers.1
111. Id. at 81. The Court also relied on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) of Title VII as support for
its holding. Section 2000e(h) states that absent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a
seniority system cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system has a
discriminatory impact. The Court noted that seniority systems are afforded special treatment
under Title VII itself and, therefore, need not be contravened. Hardison,432 U.S. at 81-83.
112. Id.at 84.
113. Id.at 78. However, "the existence of a [bona fide] seniority system does not
necessarily relieve the employer of its obligation to reasonably accommodate a religious
employee ....Kaminer, supra note 34, at 617 n.294. If such an accommodation is possible
without disrupting the seniority system or creating costs for the employer, courts tend to
require accommodation. See Balint v. Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1052-53 (9th Cir.
1999); see also Kaminer, supra note 34, at 617 n.294. For example, courts generally require
that employers at least give the religious employee the chance to find a voluntary
replacement for her shift. See Engle, supra note 28, at 396.
114. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 78-79; id. at 91-97 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that
although the majority's analysis was erroneous, the seniority rights of all employees under
the collective bargaining agreement should be preserved); EEOC v. Firestone Fibers &
Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 317 (4th Cir. 2008); Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 338
(8th Cir. 1992); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(2) (2008); see
also Engle, supra note 28, at 395; Kaminer, supra note 34, at 616-17; Kaminer, supra note
47, at 89.
115. See Hardison,432 U.S. at 84.
116. See Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 19 (noting the principle that an employer need not
bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating an employee). The author further notes
that "Hardison implies another point of some importance. The statutory provision is cast in
terms of hardship on the employer's business; the Court assumes that it includes undue
hardship on fellow workers." Id.
117. See id. Lower courts typically take the Hardison decision to stand for the
proposition that preferential treatment is tantamount to undue hardship regardless of whether
the employees are subject to a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Cook, 981 F.2d at
338; Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 487 n.ll (2d Cir. 1985) ("Hardison
may be read as equating 'undue hardship' with preferential treatment."), aff'd on other
grounds, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th
Cir. 1981); You v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1979); Bums v.
S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The Hardison Court found that the
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This second way of showing undue hardship, by demonstrating
preferential treatment, assumes that preferential treatment of a religious
employee is tantamount to an undue hardship. Despite the lack of specific
language in Hardison, § 2000e(j), or in the EEOC guidelines' 18 equating
the term "preferential treatment" with "undue hardship," courts have often
inferred their equivalence. 1 9 Lower courts, relying on Hardison, often find
that an employer can demonstrate undue hardship by showing that an
accommodation would adversely affect the religious employee's coworkers,
regardless of whether the coworkers are entitled to their preferred
employment situation under a collective bargaining agreement. 120 But
circuit courts are split over what sorts of impact on other employees amount
to such preferential treatment outside the context of12a 1collective bargaining
agreement; this is the conflict explored by this Note.
The lower courts' inference of this principle from Hardison stems from
the Supreme Court's seeming unease with giving religious employees
preferential treatment over their nonreligious coworkers. 122 Indeed, the

employer had demonstrated undue hardship where the accommodation requested by the
employee.., would have effectively required preferential treatment on the basis of
religion .. ");Aron v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., No. Civ.A.03-2581 JSH, 2005 WL 1541060,
at *6-7 (D.N.J. June 30, 2005).
118. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e) (2008) (discussing undue hardship only in terms of
financial cost and preservation of seniority rights).
119. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1469-70 (9thCir. 1996) ("We
have not read Hardison so broadly as to proscribe all differences in treatment. Instead, we
have read it to bar 'preferentialtreatment of employees."' (quoting Tooley, 648 F.2d at
1243) (citing Yott, 602 F.2d at 908)).
120. See, e.g., EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615-16 (9th Cir.
1988); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982). But see
Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1470 (noting that in Hardison, unlike in the present case, the
proposed accommodation would have interfered with the seniority rights under the collective
bargaining agreement); EEOC, supra note 18 ("An employer can show undue hardship if
accommodating an employee's religious practices.., infringes on other employees' job
"). The Hardison Court may have refused to grant Hardison's
rights or benefits ....
accommodation because doing so would have violated the collective bargaining agreement
in a way that would have denied other coworkers their contractual rights. However, in
applying Hardison to cases that do not involve a collective bargaining agreement, lower
courts often cite the following phrase:
It would be anomalous to conclude that by "reasonable accommodation" Congress
meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employees,
as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or
prefer the religious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII does not
require an employer to go that far.
Hardison,432 U.S. at 81. But see supra note 118.
121. See infra Part II.
122. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79-85; see also Prenkert & Magid, supra note 20, at 482
("[T]he Court was reluctant to interpret the accommodation requirement to require TWA to
subject Hardison's coworkers to 'unequal treatment'...."); Kaminer, supra note 34, at 579
("[C]ourts are generally reluctant to require differential or preferential treatment based on
any of the protected categories under Title VII.").
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importance of the other employees' rights is "echoed over and over" in
123
many passages of the decision.
For instance, the Hardison Court reasoned that the only way TWA could
have accommodated Hardison's religious observances, short of financial
expense, was by ordering a more senior employee to work in his place
when Hardison had a work-religion conflict.' 24 However, doing this would
deny the more senior employee his contractually guaranteed shift
preference, effectively discriminating against that employee based on his
different religion. 125 Thus, accommodating Hardison would have been
possible "only at the expense of others who had strong, but perhaps
nonreligious, reasons for not working on weekends."' 126 The court
concluded,
It would be anomalous to conclude that by "reasonable accommodation"
Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference
of some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in
order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others, 1and
we
27
conclude that Title VII does not require an employer to go that far.
In the last line of the opinion, the majority again stated it would not
construe the statute in such a way as to "require an employer to discriminate
against some employees in order to enable others to observe their
28
Sabbath."1
Although the language of § 2000e(j) would seem to require an employer,
in some circumstances, to impinge the rights or preferences of other
employees if necessary to accommodate a religious observer, 129 the

123. LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 56.03[l] (2d ed. 2009); see, e.g.,
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81 ("[T]o give Hardison Saturdays off, TWA would have had to
deprive another employee of his shift preference at least in part because he did not adhere to

a religion that observed the Saturday Sabbath."); id. ("The repeated, unequivocal emphasis
of both the language and the legislative history of Title VII is on eliminating discrimination

in employment, and such discrimination is proscribed when it is directed against majorities
as well as minorities.").
124. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81.

Earlier in the opinion, the Court dismissed the other

possible methods of accommodating Hardison as imposing more than a de minimis cost on
TWA. See id. at 76-78.

However, the dissent noted that the other methods

of

accommodation would not have involved the type of preferential treatment the majority was
concerned about or amount to more than a de minimis cost to TWA, given its large size. See
id. at 91-92 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). The dissent further argued that even if preferential

treatment were required, it would not have presented an undue hardship on TWA. Id. at 92
n.6.
125. Id. at 80-81 ("TWA would have had to deprive another employee of his shift

preference at least in part because he did not adhere to a religion that observed the Saturday
Sabbath.").

126. Id. at 81.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 85.

129. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e(j) (2006) (requiring that an accommodation not be an "undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business" without any reference to interests of
coworkers).
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Hardison majority did not interpret that section in such a fashion. 130
Rather, the Court found that, at least in the context of a collective
bargaining agreement, an employer is excused from accommodating a
religious employee if doing so would be possible only by granting a
13 1
privilege to that employee.
Noting the majority's implication that preferential treatment is not
required,132 the dissenting Justices, Thurgood Marshall and William Joseph
Brennan, Jr., read the majority opinion as barring any level of unequal or
preferential treatment of the religious employee because such treatment
would burden other employees and would thus amount to an undue
hardship on the employer. 133 They argued that the accommodation
requirement of Title VII, in fact, called for some level of unequal treatment
in favor of religious employees. 134 Rejecting the majority's rationale, the
dissent reasoned that "if an accommodation can be rejected simply because
it involves preferential treatment, then the... statute, while brimming with
'sound and fury,' ultimately 'signiflies] nothing.'"1 35
Yet the de minimis language used by the majority might suggest that
some unequal treatment could be allowed so long as it does not exceed a
very low threshold. 136 In fact, because de minimis, as a legal term, means
nontrivial, it seems as though any preferential treatment of religious
employees that is trivial should be acceptable under Hardison.137 However,

130. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81 ("The repeated, unequivocal emphasis of both the
language and the legislative history of Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in
employment, and such discrimination is proscribed when it is directed against majorities as
well as minorities."); see also BNA HANDBOOK, supra note 109, at 70.
131. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81; see also BNA HANDBOOK, supra note 109, at 70;
LARSON, supra note 123, § 56.03[1] (noting that Hardison's interest in having his religious
practices accommodated was "pitted against" the interests of three other parties: the
employer, the union, and the coemployees-of these the least important was the employer's
interest); Kaminer, supra note 34, at 588 ("The Hardison Court's hesitance to require
differential treatment of Hardison can be understood in the context of the courts' general
reluctance to require much more than neutrality in interpreting Title VII."); Prenkert &
Magid, supra note 20, at 482 ("[T]he Court was reluctant to interpret the accommodation
requirement to require TWA to subject Hardison's coworkers to 'unequal treatment,' which
would result from allowing Hardison to have Saturdays off and requiring a fellow employee
to work in his place.").
132. Although the majority never explicitly held that an accommodation that requires
preferential treatment is an undue hardship, the dissent clearly believed that preferential
treatment was the basis of the holding. Hardison,432 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 86-87 (interpreting the majority's holding as not requiring an employer to
grant "even the most minor special privilege to religious observers to enable them to follow
their faith").
134. See id. at 87.
135. Id.
136. LARSON, supra note 123, § 56.03[l] (noting that Hardison should be read to mean
that any employer action that causes nontrivial discrimination between or among its
employees on religious grounds, would constitute undue hardship on the employer).
137. See id. (noting that the term "de minimis" entered legal lexicon in the maxim "De
minimis non curat lex," meaning, "the law does not care about trifles"). The term is not, in
fact, a quantifiable unit of measurement, which can be pushed this way or that, but means
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circuit courts are split over whether infringement on coworkers' shift
preferences is considered more than a de minimis hardship when employees
have no contractual rights to such preferences. 138
3. Post-HardisonDecisions: Defining the Limits of an Employer's
Accommodation Obligation
Hardison answered some questions about an employer's accommodation
obligation, but many questions remained unanswered. Although Hardison
did give some meaning to the term "undue hardship," it left the "reasonable
accommodation" prong of § 2000e(j) undefined. Additionally, apart from
indicating that preferential treatment of a religious employee is not
required, Hardison did not give much guidance for lower courts trying to
determine what sorts of accommodations amount to preferential treatment.
Three cases that are discussed below, however, are helpful in
understanding the level of accommodation an employer must provide to a
religious employee. First, in Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 139 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an accommodation that
forced the religious employee's coworkers to take on additional, physically
hazardous work would amount to preferential treatment and would be an
undue hardship on the employer. 140 A year later, in Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., 14 1 the Supreme Court found that a state law that required an
employer to accommodate a Sabbath observer's scheduling needs,
regardless of any hardship on the employer or other employees, was
unconstitutional. 142 Finally, a year after Estate of Thornton, the Court held
in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook14 3 that once the employer has
provided a religious employee with any reasonable accommodation, the
employer has satisfied its accommodation obligation and need not show
that the employee's desired accommodation would cause undue
hardship. 144

This section first discusses Bhatia, a case decided by the Ninth Circuit,
which has been widely accepted by courts as defining the outer limit of an
employer's accommodation obligation. Next, this section examines Estate
"something so small that the law simply does not take cognizance of it; in other words, for
legal purposes it does not exist at all." Id.
138. See infra Part II.A-B; cf WOLF ET AL., supra note 82, at 114 (noting that "lower
courts have not agreed whether Hardison should be limited to the context of collective
bargaining agreements").
139. 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984).
140. Id. at 1384. Although decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
this case has gained wide acceptance among courts. See infra note 146 and accompanying
text.
141. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
142. Id. at 709-11. Although this case was not interpreting Title VII's religious
accommodation requirement, it is useful to this Note's discussion because it demonstrates a
clear concern over accommodations that might negatively affect coworkers. See infra notes
158-61 and accompanying text.
143. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
144. Id. at 68.
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of Thornton and Ansonia, which are also helpful in fully understanding the
specific conflict addressed in this Note.
a. Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.: Accommodations That Require Other
Employees To Take On Added Hazardous Work Are an Undue Hardship
Seven years after the Hardison decision, the Ninth Circuit, in Bhatia,
held that an accommodation that required a religious employee's coworkers
to take on additional, physically hazardous work would amount to an undue
hardship on the employer. 145 Courts seem to agree with this holding, and it
is now generally accepted that an employer need not go so far as to
implement an accommodation that would force coworkers to take over the
46
religious employee's dangerous job duties.1
In Bhatia, the employer, Chevron, had a policy that required all
employees whose duties involved potential exposure to toxic gases to shave
any facial hair that prevented them from achieving a gas-tight face seal
when wearing a respirator. 147 Bhatia, a devout Sikh, informed Chevron that
he could not comply with the requirement because his religion forbids the
cutting or shaving of body hair. 14 8 Chevron offered Bhatia three clerical
jobs as possible accommodations to his work-religion conflict, and he
refused all three. 149 Chevron then suspended Bhatia without pay, although
it had previously terminated his coworkers who refused to shave for
nonreligious reasons. 150 Chevron promised to return Bhatia to his position
15
if a respirator was developed that would be safe for him to use. 1
The court held that retaining Bhatia in his position, unable to use a
respirator, would cause Chevron an undue hardship. 152 If it kept him in his
position and assigned him duties that involved exposure to toxic gas,
Chevron would risk liability for violating California Occupational Safety
and Health Administration standards.153 If it retained Bhatia in his position
but directed his supervisors to only assign him duties that involved no
154
exposure to toxic gas, the burden on Chevron would be quite severe.
First, Chevron would have to completely revamp its system of assigning
145. 734 F.2d at 1384.
146. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1468 (9th Cir. 1996); EEOC
v. Oak-Rite Mfg. Corp., No. IP99-1962-C-H/G, 2001 WL 1168156, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Aug.
27, 2001); Kalsi v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); see
also Sonne, supra note 21, at 1055-56 (citing Bhatia for the proposition that employers need
not take any action that would impair the safety of the workplace to accommodate a religious
employee); EEOC, supra note 18.
147. 734 F.2d at 1383.
148. Id.
149. Id. Bhatia eventually accepted transfer to a janitorial position, which was a
seventeen percent decrease in income, although soon thereafter, he filed suit against Chevron
for religious discrimination. Id.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1384.
Id.
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duties to predict when a duty would involve exposure to toxic gases. 15 5
Also, because Bhatia would not be able to be exposed to the toxic gas, his
coworkers would be required to assume his share of potentially hazardous
work. 156 The court stated that Title VII does not require an employer to go
57
that far.'
b. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.
A year after Bhatia, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its concern about
accommodations of a religious employee that may burden other employees
in Estate of Thornton.158 Although not interpreting Title VII's religious
accommodation requirement, this case involved the constitutionality of a
Connecticut statute that gave employees the unfettered right not to work on
the Sabbath of their religious faith. 159
In holding such a statute
unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause, the Court was careful to point out that a shortcoming of the statute
was that it "[took] no account of the convenience or interests of the
160
employer or those of other employees who [did] not observe a Sabbath."'
The Court again showed its concern for the burden that such a statute could
create for a religious employee's coworkers by noting that there is no
exception "when honoring the dictates of Sabbath observers would cause
the employer substantial economic burdens or when the employer's
compliance would require the imposition of significant burdens on other
employees required to work in place of the Sabbath observers."' 16 1 Read
together, Bhatia, Estate of Thornton, and Hardison suggest that a
"significant burden" on other employees is sufficient to show an undue
162
hardship on the employer.

155. Id.

156. Id.
157. Id.

158. 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985).
159. Id. at 708-09.
160. Id. at 709. Quoting Judge Learned Hand, the Court noted that "'The First
Amendment... gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others
must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities."' Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
161. Id. at 709-10. The Court also noted that "employees who have strong and
legitimate, but nonreligious, reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the
statute." Id. at 710 n.9.
162. Id. at 710; see Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions-A
Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 641 (1999) (noting that under
Title VII, an employer must accommodate a religious employee so long as the
accommodation requires only a de minimis cost "and does not impose any significant
burdens on coworkers"). A significant burden is one that is more than de minimis. LARSON,
supra note 123, § 56.031]. What amounts to a significant burden on coworkers is
considered in Part II infra.
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c. Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook: The Supreme Court's
Interpretationof "ReasonableAccommodation"
In 1986, disregarding 163 the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Religion, 164 the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Ansonia, which held that an employer is not required to accept any
particular accommodation that the religious employee proposes.165 Instead,
once the employer has provided any reasonable accommodation, the
statutory inquiry is at an end and the employer need not show that the
66
employee's desired accommodation would cause undue hardship.'
Although not interpreting the undue hardship prong of § 2000e(j), the
Ansonia Court reaffirmed the holding in Hardison16 7 and is useful in fully
8
understanding the scope of an employer's accommodation obligation.16
Ronald Philbrook was a teacher and, like Larry Hardison, a member of
the Worldwide Church of God. 169 As part of his religious observance,
Philbrook was required to celebrate six religious holidays each year that
caused him to be absent from school. 170 Under the terms of Philbrook's
collective bargaining agreement, teachers were given three paid days off
each year for religious reasons as well as three personal days off each
year.' 7 1 However, personal days could not be used for any purpose that
already had a designated leave policy and, therefore, they could not be used
72
for religious purposes. 1
For a period of time, Philbrook used the three religious days off and then
took unauthorized days off (time off without pay) to satisfy the religious
163. The Supreme Court noted that the EEOC Guidelines are accorded less weight than
administrative regulations that Congress has declared are entitled to the force of law.
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69-70 n.6 (1986). However, in Justice
Marshall's Ansonia opinion, he noted that in the previous term, the Supreme Court relied on
EEOC guidelines in interpreting Title VII. He argued that the Court's refusal to rely on the
EEOC's interpretation in Ansonia "rests on nothing more than a selective reading of the
express provisions of Title VII and the guidelines." Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Kaminer, supra note 34, at 596.
164. 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1985). In part, the 1985 guidelines that the Ansonia Court ignored
stated that "when there is more than one means of accommodation which would not cause
undue hardship, the employer or labor organization must offer the alternative which least
disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her employment opportunities." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605.2(c)(2)(ii).
165. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 67 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977));
see also Oleske, supra note 34, at 532.
168. Commentators suggest that the scope of an employer's duty to accommodate a
religious employee is quite limited, amounting to little more than a "dead letter." See
Prenkert & Magid, supra note 20, at 468 ("[C]ourts have created muddled and ineffective
doctrines and rules [relating to the religious accommodation requirement]. As a result, over
time, the accommodation requirement is likely to continue its evolution into a dead letter.");
Kaminer, supra note 34, at 577-79.
169. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 62.
170. Id. at 62-63.
171. Id. at 63-64.
172. Id. at64.
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requirement of celebrating the six holy days. 173 However, after some time,
Philbrook was dissatisfied with this arrangement and suggested an
accommodation that the school board could make to allow him to observe
his religion. 174 Philbrook suggested that he be allowed to use the three
personal days for religious reasons or, alternatively, pay for a substitute
teacher himself for days when he could not work. 175 However, the school
176
board rejected both of these proposals.
In holding for the school board, the Supreme Court noted that neither the
legislative history nor the plain language of Title VII required an employer
to accept any particular accommodation requested by a religious
employee. 17 7 Once a reasonable accommodation was offered to the
employee, the employer's statutory duty was fulfilled and the employer was
not required to prove that the proposed accommodations would have
78
presented an undue hardship to the employer.1
The Ansonia court found that, generally, unpaid leave would be a
reasonable accommodation because the employee was merely giving up pay
for time that he did not actually work. 179 Although Philbrook would have
preferred a different, and possibly also reasonable accommodation, the
school board had fulfilled its
obligation and was not required to accept his
80
proposed accommodation. 1
The cases discussed in this section somewhat delineate the employer's
obligation to accommodate a religious employee. They teach that an
employer is not required to implement a religious employee's desired
accommodation if a reasonable accommodation has already been offered.'81
They also show clear judicial concern over accommodations that might

173. Id.
174. Id. at 64-65.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 65.
177. Id. at 68-71.
178. Id. at 68. But see Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 17 ("But an accommodation should
not count as reasonable if supervisors should not have supposed it would resolve a worker's
religious conflict, given all the facts that the supervisors learned during their conversations
with the worker.").
179. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 70-71. The Court was unable to address the reasonableness of
this particular policy because the lower court applied an erroneous view of the law and
neither explicitly considered the issue. Id. at 70. The Court stated that it had insufficient
factual findings to judge the policy at issue but noted that generally, the school board's
policy would be a reasonable one. Id. at 71; see also Kaminer, supra note 34, at 594.
180. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68-69.
It also should be noted that a reasonable
accommodation need not be initiated by the employer in response to the employee's protest
of a religious conflict; thus, reasonable accommodations may be found in policies that the
employer already has in place. See Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 144 n.2
(5th Cir. 1982) ("Hardison demonstrated that an employer's reasonable accommodation of
an employee's religious observances need not be initiated in response to the employee's
protest. The seniority system and weekend work crew policy were established before
Hardison made known his difficulties.").
181. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
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negatively affect other employees. 182 But how far must an employer go
when an accommodation would impact other employees?
The question of what sorts of burdens on coworkers amount to
preferential treatment of the religious employee is still largely
unanswered. 183
Apart from stating that an accommodation that
significantly burdens other employees is not required, 184 the Court did not
state what constitutes a significant burden. 185 Thus, lower courts, citing
Hardison as authority, have found that varying degrees of imposition on
86
coworkers amount to preferential treatment and an undue hardship. 1
With these questions in mind, this Note will focus on circuit courts'
interpretation of "preferential treatment," outside the context of a collective
bargaining agreement. Part II of this Note will discuss the split in circuit
courts' interpretations of Hardison, giving rise to differing views of what
constitutes preferential treatment. Specifically, Part II will examine at what
point courts have found that a negative effect on other employees' shift
preferences amounts to preferential treatment and whether employee
complaints or general unhappiness with an accommodation is sufficient to
show such treatment.
II. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS: WHAT CONSTITUTES
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT?

As discussed in Part I.E, the Hardison Court clearly demonstrated its
concern with allowing a religious employee to have preferential treatment
over his coworkers simply because the coworkers did not adhere to the
same religion.' 87 This concern has become an underlying principle for
182. See supra notes 145-46, 156, 160-61. See generally supra Part I.E. 1-2, E.3.a-b.
183. Kaminer, supra note 34, at 611.
184. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985).
185. One way that courts have defined when an accommodation amounts to preferential
treatment is by applying the Hardison de minimis standard. See, e.g., Turpen v. Mo.-Kan.Tex. R.R., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Hardison held that the statute does not
require an employer to deviate from its seniority system in order to give an employee shift
preference for religious reasons... and that accommodation that would require an employer
to incur a greater than de minimis cost or would create a greater than de minimis imposition
on co-workers constitutes undue hardship." (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977))). If an accommodation is more than a de minimis burden on other
employees, then it is "significant" and amounts to preferential treatment. Relying on the
Hardison decision, courts have noted that an accommodation that results in more than a de
minimis imposition on coworkers goes beyond differential treatment and can constitute
preferential treatment. But the type of impact on coworkers that is more than de minimis,
leading to preferential treatment, is not clear. See Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers
D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1981) (explaining that the rationale underlying
the determination that greater than a de minimis imposition on coworkers amounts to an
undue hardship is that anything more than de minimis would result in discrimination against
other employees, a result that Congress did not intend).
186. See infra Part II.A-B.
187. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977) (noting that to
accommodate Hardison, "TWA would have had to deprive another employee of his shift
preference at least in part because he did not adhere to a religion that observed the Saturday
Sabbath"). Even before Hardison, the court in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324
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lower courts when determining whether negative impact on coworkers
amounts to an undue hardship on the employer. 188 Lower courts agree that
an employer can show that an accommodation causes an undue hardship if
it would go beyond permissible differential treatment of the religious
employee and amount to prohibited preferential treatment.18 9 However,
courts seem to disagree over whether impact on coworkers' shift
preferences amounts to preferential treatment outside the context of a
collective bargaining agreement. This Part examines that disagreement of
authority.1 90
The conflict over the scope of preferential treatment seems to stem from
courts' differing interpretations of Hardison and the breadth of its
authoritative value. Uneasy about allowing coworkers' shift preferences to
be infringed upon due to a religious accommodation, many courts cite
(6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam), noted
its concern with the impact an accommodation would have on other employees. Although
this decision was before the 1972 amendment to Title VII, the court expressed its discomfort
with allowing one person to "coerce or compel [another person] to accede to or
accommodate the religious beliefs of [another]." Id. at 334. However, this decision has no
precedential authority and was in fact the impetus for the 1972 amendment to Title VII. See
supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 487 n.ll (2d Cir. 1985)
(noting that "Hardison may be read as equating 'undue hardship' with preferential
treatment"), aff'd on other grounds, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,
648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The religious accommodation provisions do not
authorize preferential treatment of employees."); see also Reply Brief For PlaintiffAppellant at 11, Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 1996) (No.
94-16542) (arguing that the trial court erred in finding preferential treatment because other
employees did not have seniority rights and thus any impact on coworkers' shift preferences
was not preferential treatment); Engle, supra note 28, at 394 (noting that the idea that an
accommodation for a particular employee is often seen as discriminatory provides a
background for courts in the religious discrimination context).
189. See Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 1979) ("The Court in
Hardison held that differential treatment resulting from accommodation runs afoul of §
2000e-2(a)(1) if it: (1) would compromise other employees' contractual seniority rights as
secured by a collective bargaining agreement; or (2) would confer a privilege, the cost of
which was more than [de minimis], solely on the basis of the recipient's religious beliefs.");
see also EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 318 (4th Cir. 2008) ("If
Firestone were not to apply the attendance policy to one, and only one, employee, it would
risk lowering morale by displaying favoritism .... "); Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d
1461, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Hardison as proscribing "'preferential treatment
of employees"' not as proscribing all differences in treatment of employees (quoting Tooley,
648 F.2d at 1243) (citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81; Yott v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 602
F.2d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 1979))); Philbrook, 757 F.2d at 487 n. 11; Burns v. S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The Hardison Court found that the employer had
demonstrated undue hardship where the accommodation
requested by the
employee ... would have effectively required preferential treatment on the basis of
religion .... ).
190. See, e.g., Reply Brief For Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 188, at 10 (arguing
successfully that the court should not extend the protection afforded to a bona fide seniority
system to all accommodation alternatives that may cause an impact on coworkers, even in a
de minimis way). But see Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the mere possibility that an accommodation would adversely affect coworkers
is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship).
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language in Hardison1 9 1 as proof that such treatment is preferential and thus
prohibited. 192 However, other courts reserve such language for religious
accommodations that would require breach of a bona fide seniority system
93
or other violation of the coworkers' contractual rights. 1
Part II.A discusses the broader view of Hardison, which protects
coworkers' shift preferences outside the context of a collective bargaining
agreement. Courts adopting this view find that an accommodation that
negatively impacts coworker shift preferences, regardless of whether the
employees are subject to a collective bargaining agreement, amounts to
preferential treatment. Part II.B discusses the narrower view of Hardison,
which requires demonstration of a more severe impact on coworkers before
preferential treatment will be found, indicating that infringement on shift
preferences, outside the context of a collective bargaining agreement, does
not in itself amount to an undue hardship.
A. The Fifth CircuitApproach
194
Noting the phrase "shift and job preference" in the Hardison language,
some courts, such as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, hold that it is preferential treatment, and thus an undue hardship, to
impinge upon the shift "preference" of other employees in order to
accommodate a religious employee. 19 5 Thus, these courts seem to imply a
"right" to shift preferences that, if infringed upon, constitutes an undue
191. The language reads as follows:
It would be anomalous to conclude that by "reasonable accommodation" Congress
meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employees,
as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or
prefer the religious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII does not
require an employer to go that far.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977).
192. See, e.g., Weber, 199 F.3d at 273; Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141,
146 (5th Cir. 1982).
193. See Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1470 ("In Hardison, the proposed accommodation
would have conflicted with the contractually-established seniority system, thus violating an
employee's seniority rights... by denying him his shift preferences. By contrast, in this
case, the scheduling of shifts was not governed by any collective bargaining agreement, and
the proposed accommodation would not have deprived any employee of any contractuallyestablished... rights or privileges of any kind." (citing Hardison,432 U.S. at 80)).
194. Hardison,432 U.S. at 81; see also supra note 191 and accompanying text.
195. Brener, 671 F.2d at 146 n.5 ("Brener argues that Hardison is distinguishable from
this case because a collective bargaining agreement was involved, but the excerpt quoted
above clearly indicates that the court's concern was not only with breach of the agreement,
but also with the preferential treatment of some employees on the basis of religion."); id. at
147 ("Brener[] ... underestimates the actual imposition on other employees in depriving
them of their shift preference at least partly because they do not adhere to the same religion
as Brener."); see also Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 593 (11th
Cir. 1994) (citing Hardison and rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the Hardison Court
intended its holding to apply only in the context of a collectively bargained agreement, not in
the context of a neutral rotating system such as was used by his employer); id. ("Rather, our
reading of Hardison suggests that the Court was concerned primarily with the neutrality of
the system utilized."); WOLF ET AL., supra note 82, at 114-15.
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hardship, regardless of whether employees have a contractually established
96
right to such preferences. 1
1. Brener v. DiagnosticCenter Hospital
In Brener, the Fifth Circuit allowed proof of employee unhappiness and
complaints about a proposed accommodation to be treated as evidence of
preferential treatment and thus an undue hardship on the employer, even in
the absence of a collective bargaining agreement. 197 There, Brener, a
pharmacist and Orthodox Jew, sought an accommodation so that he could
observe his Sabbath from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. 198 After
Brener indicated to his supervisor, Luther, that he could not work on the
Sabbath, Luther directed shift trades with other employees for a few
200
weeks. 199 Thereafter, Brener had to arrange the shift trades himself.
When Brener informed Luther that he needed to miss three days of work for
Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, Luther directed other employees to trade
Christmas holidays with Brener for these holidays. 20 1 Soon thereafter,
Luther began receiving complaints from other pharmacists regarding
20 2
Brener's special treatment.
When Brener made another request to have off for four days due to the
holiday of Sukkos, Luther replied that because of a morale problem among
the other pharmacists, he could not direct further shift trades. 20 3 He
20 4
indicated, however, that Brener was free to arrange such trades himself.
Brener failed to arrange a shift exchange, however, and did not work as
scheduled for two days during Sukkos. 20 5 During a meeting regarding
196. See Weber, 199 F.3d at 273 (holding that a religious accommodation would force the
employer to deny the shift and job preferences of the other employees, constituting an undue
hardship on the employer, although noting the employees had no contractual entitlement to
such preferences).
197. 671 F.2d at 146; see also BNA HANDBOOK, supra note 109, at 70 (noting the
difference in treatment of employee grumbling among courts). Generally, courts hold that
mere employee unhappiness with an accommodation does not justify refusing to make it, and
virtually all courts use language endorsing that view. See Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 147071; EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[P]roof of
coworkers' 'unhappiness with a particular accommodation' is not enough to show undue
hardship." (quoting Bums v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978)));
Brener, 671 F.2d at 147 (noting that Brener mischaracterized the burden on coworkers as
mere employee grumbling); Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d
397, 402 (9th Cir. 1978) ("'If relief under Title VII can be denied merely because the
majority group of employees . . . will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of
correcting the wrongs to which the Act is directed."' (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 775 (1976))); Lambert v. Condor Mfg., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 600, 603-04
(E.D. Mich. 1991).
198. Brener, 671 F.2d at 142-43.
199. Id. at 143.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 143-44.
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Brener's failure to work when scheduled, Luther informed Brener that he
would direct a shift trade for the last two days of Sukkos. 20 6 However
when shift trades were not scheduled, and Brener missed work again, he
207
resigned.
The district court held for the hospital, noting that Luther had taken
affirmative steps to alter his long-standing policy of not directing shift
trades, demonstrating his willingness to reasonably accommodate
Brener.20 8 The court concluded that the employee has a duty to cooperate
with the employer's efforts to accommodate and, had Brener tried harder to
arrange shift trades himself, he would have been able to reconcile his workreligion conflict.20 9 The court also concluded that accommodating Brener
any further would have resulted in an undue hardship on the hospital and on
20
Brener's coworkers. '
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court and reached two
conclusions. 2 11 First, it held that Brener did not fulfill his duty to "fully
explore the possibilities for accommodation within the pharmacy's flexible
scheduling system" (i.e., arranging shift trades with other employees). 212
Second, the court found that an "employer suffers undue hardship when
required to bear greater than [de minimis] cost or imposition upon coworker." 2 13 Relying on Hardison, the court reasoned that continuing to
2 14
direct shift trades would lower morale among the other pharmacists.
The court rejected Brener's characterization of the complaints as mere
grumbling, insufficient to show preferential treatment, and noted that the
imposition on other employees deprived them of their shift preferences at
least in part because they did not adhere to the same religion as Brener. 215
Brener pointed out that his coworkers were not subject to a collective
bargaining agreement and their shift preferences were not rights as they
were in Hardison.2 16 However, the court rejected this argument, stating
that the Hardison court was also concerned with the preferential treatment
of some employees on the basis of religion, even outside the context of a
collective bargaining agreement. 2 17 The court held that Hardison applied
206. Id. at 144.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 147.
212. Id. at 146.
213. Id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)).
214. Id. at 147.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 146 n.5; see also BNA HANDBOOK, supra note 109, at 45.
217. Brener, 671 F.2d at 146 n.5. The Hardison decision does not expressly address this
conclusion, however. In fact, the Hardison Court seemed to direct its attention to the

existence of a seniority system, which was in tension with Title VII's accommodation duty,
and did not address a non-seniority-system scenario. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79 ("[W]e do
not believe that the duty to acconmmodate requires TWA to take steps inconsistent with the
otherwise valid [collective bargaining] agreement."); id. at 81 (supporting the holding with

evidence that seniority systems are afforded special treatment under Title VII); id. at 83 n.14
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and that directing
shift trades for Brener amounted to preferential
2 18
treatment.
The Fifth Circuit's holding echoed the Hardison Court's discomfort with
2 19
preferential treatment of religious employees over their coworkers.
Although the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that employee complaints and
unhappiness are insufficient to show preferential treatment, commentators
have argued that, in fact, the Brener court primarily focused on these
complaints as proof that accommodating Brener would involve preferential
220
treatment and, thus, an undue hardship.
The court's concern with coworker unhappiness can be seen by analyzing
the inherent conflict in the court's conclusions. On one hand, the court
found that Brener could have potentially arranged voluntary shift trades on
his own and that his failure to do so did not result, as Brener claimed,
"[from] the reluctance of other employees to trade schedules with him. ' 22 1
Rather, the court found that this failure resulted from the fact that Brener
made "only haphazard efforts to arrange schedule trades. '222 On the other
hand, the court determined that it would be an undue hardship for Luther to
continue directing the shift trades. 2 23 It is not clear how the court could
have determined that there were other employees willing to swap shifts with
Brener yet also conclude that an employer-arranged shift swap would have
negatively impacted other employees so as to cause undue hardship. 224 If
we accept that there were other employees who would have traded with
Brener had he made a greater effort to swap shifts, then it would not have
been a burden on the employer to direct those employees to trade with
him. 225 Since this finding seems to be contradictory, the court appears to
have found that Brener's accommodation amounted to preferential
treatment based on the coworkers' complaints that Brener's accommodation
was negatively impacting the other employees' shift preferences. 2 26

("[T]he dissent appears to agree with.., the fundamental proposition that Title VII does not

require an employer and a union who have agreed on a seniority system to deprive senior
employees of their seniority rights in order to accommodate a junior employee's religious
practices. This is the principal issue on which TWA and the union came to this Court.").
218. See Brener, 671 F.2d at 146.
219. Id. at 146 n.5 (noting that the Hardison Court's concern was not only with breach of
the seniority system but also with preferential treatment of some employees on the basis of
religion).

220. See Kaminer, supra note 34, at 620; Lisa E. Key, Co-worker Morale,
Confidentiality, and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 1003, 1017-18,
1020 (1997) (discussing Brener and noting that the court used a low threshold of impact to
coworker morale to find an undue hardship).
221. Brener, 671 F.2d at 145; see also Kaminer, supra note 34, at 620-21.
222. Brener, 671 F.2d at 145.
223. Id. at 146-47.
224. See Kaminer, supra note 34, at 621.
225. See id. at 620.
226. See id. at 621.
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2. Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-TexasRailroad Co.

In another Fifth Circuit decision, the court stated that coworker
unhappiness was insufficient to prove undue hardship, but it nevertheless
placed importance on coworker complaints in determining that a religious
accommodation amounted to preferential treatment of a religious
employee. 22 7 In Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co.,228 the
court concluded that accommodating Turpen, a Sabbath observer, would
amount to preferential treatment. 22 9 The court further held that the

employer, a railroad company, was not required even to inquire about other
employees' willingness to participate in a voluntary shift swap for
Turpen. 230 After noting that the employer had received some complaints
about the proposed accommodation, the court found that the employer made
a "'reasonable assumption' ... that 'such an inquiry... would have been
futile."'231

This finding relied solely on the fact that Turpen's supervisor had
received complaints from other employees about Turpen's desire to have
his Sabbath off from work and thus believed that a job swap would be
impossible. 232 In so finding, the court noted that an "accommodation that
would require an employer to incur a greater than de minimis cost or would
create a greater than de minimis imposition on coworkers constitutes undue
hardship." 233 The Fifth Circuit found that complaints regarding the
possible negative impact on coworkers surrounding a proposed religious
accommodation were enough to demonstrate more than a de minimis
burden on coworkers and, thus, preferential treatment of the religious
234
employee.

227. Turpen v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 736 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1984).
228. 736 U.S. 1022.
229. Id. at 1028.
230. Id. at 1027.
231. Id. It should be noted that the employees in this case were subject to a collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 1024-25. Therefore, the employer was not required to breach
the seniority system within that agreement. Id. at 1027. However, the finding that the
employer was not obligated to even inquire as to whether other employees would be willing
to swap shifts with the plaintiff, due to the complaints received about such an
accommodation, is also relevant outside the context of a collective bargaining agreement. Cf
Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that possible
burden on coworkers constitutes an undue hardship). But see EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881
F.2d 1504, 1513 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding against an employer who refused to even ask for
volunteers to work shifts for two employees who requested off to observe their Sabbath).
232. Turpen, 736 F.2d at 1025.
233. Id. at 1026 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)).
234. Id. (holding that the district court did not err when it found an undue hardship on the
employer based on employee complaints about filling in for Turpen). The court further
noted that the employer did not need to inquire about possible voluntary shift swaps because
such an inquiry would have been futile due to such complaints. Id. at 1027.
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3. Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc.
235
More recently, the Fifth Circuit in Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc.
again emphasized coworker unhappiness by holding that an accommodation
that could have even a possibility of adversely impacting coworkers
amounted to preferential treatment. 236 Citing Hardison, the Weber court
held that "[t]he mere possibility of an adverse impact on coworkers as a
result of [an accommodation] is sufficient to constitute an undue
hardship. ' 237 In that case, a truck driver, Weber, informed his employer, a
trucking company, that his religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness required
him to refrain from making overnight driving trips with a female coworker
who was not his wife. 23 8 His supervisor told him that working with women
was part of his job and that he would have to work with them or he would
not receive any driving assignments. 239 The district court granted summary
judgment for Roadway, and held that accommodating Weber would force
Roadway to deny the job preferences of Weber's coworkers, which would
240
constitute an undue burden.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that although Weber's coworkers had
no contractual right entitling them to a specific run preference, they were
not excluded from Hardison's coverage. 24 1 On appeal, Weber argued that
accommodating him by "skipping over" him when a job would require the
drivers to have an overnight with a female coworker would not be an undue
hardship because Roadway "skipped over" other drivers for various secular
reasons. 242 He also urged that Roadway's defense-that accommodating
him would deny other drivers their shift preferences-was a hypothetical
burden and unlikely to occur. 24 3 Additionally, Weber argued that
his
244
coworkers' shift preferences were not contractually protected rights.
The Fifth Circuit rejected Weber's arguments, reasoning that skipping
over Weber would be more than a de minimis hardship on coworkers
because it would unduly burden them with respect to compensation and
"time-off' concerns. 24 5 To support this proposition, the court referenced
hypothetical situations where after skipping over Weber, a substitute driver
may have to accept a shorter run than he or she might otherwise have
received, which would provide less pay. 246 Additionally the substitute

235. 199 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2000).
236. See id. at 274.

237. Id. (noting that "the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that
affected the possible job preferences of other employees" (citing Hardison,432 U.S. at 81)).

238. Id. at 272.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 272-73.
241. Id. at 273.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 274.
246. Id. However, it seems equally as likely that a substitute would in fact get a longer
and higher paying run as a result of having to accommodate Weber.
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might also receive less rest and time off between runs than he or she might
otherwise have received. 24 7 The court found that the "mere possibility" of
such impact on a coworker was enough to justify a finding of undue
hardship. 248 Rejecting Weber's argument that the negative impact was too
hypothetical and remote, the court noted that federal law does not require
the employer to wait until it feels the effect
of a proposed accommodation
2 49
before arguing that it is an undue hardship.
The court then addressed Weber's argument that he easily could be
accommodated because Roadway often skipped over other employees for
secular reasons. 250 Rejecting this contention, the court accepted Roadway's
argument that it only accommodated other employees for secular reasons by
skipping over if business circumstances allowed it. 25 1 Thus, because
Weber's accommodation would be inflexible, it was not a 2de minimis
25
burden even though the burden was, at the time, hypothetical.
Citing Hardison, the court stated that an accommodation amounts to an
undue hardship if it would force changes in the schedules of other
employees and alter the employer's otherwise neutral scheduling
procedure. 253 Yet in Hardison, the neutral scheduling procedure was a
contractually guaranteed right that would have been denied had Hardison
been accommodated. 254 By contrast, the Weber system, while neutral, was
not contractually guaranteed. 255 Despite none of the drivers being
contractually entitled to any specific run, the Weber court found that
implementing an accommodation that had a possibility of adversely
impacting coworkers amounted to preferential treatment sufficient to give
256
rise to a finding of undue hardship on the employer.
B. The Ninth CircuitApproach
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit takes a different
approach than that of the Fifth Circuit detailed in Part II.A. The Ninth
Circuit approach tends to focus its determination of the existence of
preferential treatment on whether other employees have any contractual
247. Id. It should be noted that the system utilized by Roadway for dispatching drivers
such as Weber was based on the order in which they returned from runs. Id. at 272.
However, it is not clear that the "time off" between runs was always constant and equal
among drivers.
248. Id. at 274 (noting that the Hardison Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation
that affected the possible job preferences of other employees).
249. Id. at 274-75 (citing Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633 (1 1th Cir. 1995)).
250. Id. at 273. The court noted that Roadway allowed drivers to submit a "refuse-toride" letter when the driver does not want to be paired with another specific driver with
whom he has previously ridden. Also drivers are allowed to "divorce" other drivers if they
no longer wish to ride together. Id. at 273 n. 1.
251. Id. at 275.
252. Id.

253. Id.
254. See id, at 273.
255. Id.

256. Id. at 274.
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entitlement to shift and job preferences that may be infringed upon because
of a religious accommodation. 257 The Ninth Circuit, as well as the Eighth
Circuit, 258 interpret Hardison as applying primarily in the context of a

collective bargaining agreement or when an accommodation would interfere
with employees' contractual rights. 259 According to the Ninth Circuit,
because Hardison does not apply outside the context of a collective
bargaining agreement, an accommodation infringing upon the shift
preferences of employees is not a legally significant burden because the
employees never had any contractually established right to have such
preferences in the first place. 260 In such a situation, no preferential
257. See Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Balint v.
Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1054-55, 1055 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing OpukuBoateng v. Californiabased on the existence of a bona fide seniority system and holding that
the city was not required to breach such a system to accommodate Balint); id. at 1054
(noting that "[u]ndue hardship may... be present when an accommodation would cause
more than a de minimis impact on coworkers, such as depriving coworkers of seniority
rights"); cf U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403-05 (2002); WOLKINSON, supra
note 87, at 150 (noting that the HardisonCourt stated that the duty to accommodate does not
"justify the denial of shift and job preference rights of other workers"); Oleske, supra note
34, at 532-33 (noting that the Hardison "Court held that a requested accommodation is not
reasonable if it would require an employer to infringe on the rights of other employees"
(citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79-81 (1977))).
258. Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1979). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's finding that accommodating
Brown was impermissible because it "would in effect discriminate against all employees
who did not adhere to [the plaintiffs] religion." Instead, the court stated,
Such an application of Hardison would provide a per se proscription against any
and all forms of differential treatment based on religion.
Carried to its logical conclusion the [district] court's application of the quoted
language [from Hardison] would preclude all forms of accommodation and defeat
the very purpose behind § 2000e(j).
Id. at 961-62.
259. See Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1470 ("In Hardison, the proposed accommodation
would have conflicted with the contractually-established seniority system, thus violating an
employee's seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement by denying him his
shift preferences. By contrast, in this case, the scheduling of shifts was not governed by any
collective bargaining agreement, and the proposed accommodation would not have deprived
any employee of any contractually-established seniority rights or privileges, or indeed of any
contractually-established rights or privileges of any kind." (citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at
80)). The Opuku-Boateng court also cited its previous decision, EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel,
881 F.2d 1504, 1513 (9th Cir. 1989), which interpreted Hardison as addressing only "'the
degree of accommodation that was required of an employer within the framework of a
[collectively bargained] seniority system."' Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1470 n.15 (quoting
Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1513); see also WOLF ET AL., supra note 82, at 114 (discussing
Opuku-Boateng and noting that the court found that without the loss of contractual rights, the
changes in shift schedules requested by Opuku-Boateng imposed no more than a de minimis
burden on other employees).
260. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1055 n.8 (citing Opuku-Boateng and distinguishing Balint
because there, the seniority system determined which employees had to work the most
undesirable shifts. Comparatively, in Opuku-Boateng, all employees had to work the same
number of undesirable shifts and thus no one had the right to choose which undesirable shifts
they wanted to work); see also Reply Brief For Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 188, at 11
(arguing that the impacts on other employees "do not relate to scheduling rights guaranteed

1368

FORDHAMLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 78

treatment in favor of the religious employee occurs; rather, differential
treatment occurs because when there is no contractual right to have certain
selected shifts, each1 employee is required to work the same amount of
26
undesirable shifts.
The Ninth Circuit has found that employee complaints regarding
scheduling preferences and a lowering in employee morale are not enough
263
to constitute preferential treatment. 262 In Opuku-Boateng v. California,
the Ninth Circuit held that an employer's claim of undue hardship must be
supported by more than mere proof
of coworkers' unhappiness with a
264
particular religious accommodation.
In Opuku-Boateng, the court refused to rely on employee complaints as
evidence of preferential treatment and undue hardship.2 65 There, the court
was faced with the issue of whether the religious needs of Opuku-Boateng,
a Seventh Day Adventist, could be accommodated by his employer without
26 6
enduring an undue hardship.
After Opuku-Boateng applied for and received a job as a plant inspector,
he informed his employer that he would not be able to work from sundown
Friday to sundown Saturday due to his religious observance of the
Sabbath. 26 7 After attempting to negotiate a schedule in which OpukuBoateng would not be required to work on his Sabbath, his employer
notified him that his request to have off during this time was not reasonable
and, therefore, if Opuku-Boateng wanted to work as a plant inspector, he
would be required to work as scheduled. 268 Opuku-Boateng offered to

by a seniority system or collective bargaining agreement and would not result in more than a
de minimis .. .economic cost").

261. Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1470 (noting that under the seniority system in Hardison,
some of the TWA employees had the contractual right to choose to work fewer undesirable
shifts than others). However, the employees in Opuku-Boateng had no seniority rights and
were required to work "an equal number of undesirable weekend, holiday, and night shifts."
Id. So long as Opuku-Boateng worked an equal amount of undesirable shifts, the court
posited, he would not have been granted any preferential treatment, nor would any burden
have been imposed on his coworkers, who would merely be given one undesirable shift
instead of another. Id.
262. See id. at 1473; cf Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 607 (9th Cir.
2004). The court in Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co. noted that accommodating an
employee's religious beliefs did not create undue hardship for an employer merely because
the employee's coworkers found his conduct unwelcome. Id. Indeed, "complete harmony in
the workplace is not an objective of Title VII. 'If relief under Title VII can be denied merely
because the majority group of employees, who have not suffered discrimination, will be
unhappy about it, there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the Act is
directed."' Id. (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 775 (1976)). The
court also stated that "Hewlett-Packard must tolerate some degree of employee
discomfort ....Id.
263. 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996).
264. See id. at 1473; EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 616 (9th Cir.
1988).
265. See Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1469-70.
266. Id. at 1464-66.
267. Id. at 1465.
268. Id. at 1465-66.
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trade shifts with other employees and take their equally undesirable shifts,9
26
such as holidays and overnights, in exchange for having his Sabbath off.
However, the employer claimed that it had done a poll to determine whether
any other employees would be willing to trade shifts with Opuku-Boateng,
and, although a few employees had indicated that they would be willing to
trade occasionally, no one responded that they would be willing to
accommodate him permanently. 270 A week later, the employer notified
Opuku-Boateng that he would not be appointed as a plant inspector due to
2 71
his unavailability from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday.
The district court found that scheduling Opuku-Boateng to be off every
Sabbath was an unreasonable accommodation "because it would have had a
discriminatory impact on other employees and more than a de minimis
impact on the operation" of the business of the State. 272 The court
determined that accommodating Opuku-Boateng would have required
"other employees to work more than their fair share of Friday night[s] and
2 73
Saturday[s]," resulting in a substantial morale problem.
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erred
2 74
with respect to the purported impact on Opuku-Boateng's coworkers.
The court delved deeper into whether the supposed burden on coworkers
and the complaints surrounding the accommodation actually justified a
finding of undue hardship. 275 The court noted that Hardison does not
proscribe all differences in treatment among employees; instead, it only
bars "'preferential treatment of employees."' 276 None of the other
employees were subject to a seniority system and, thus, all employees were
required to work an equal number of undesirable shifts. 277 Since OpukuBoateng was willing to work an equal number of undesirable shifts as his
coworkers, the court found that an accommodation in this case would only
result in a difference in treatment, not preferential treatment, and, therefore,
278
it would not be an undue hardship.
The court, citing Hardison, suggested that more than interference with
coworker shift preferences would be necessary to find that there was an
undue hardship, 279 relieving the employer of accommodating Opuku269. Id. at 1465.
270. Id. at 1466.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1469.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See Kaminer, supra note 34, at 618-19.
276. Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1469-70 (quoting Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648
F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981)). The court noted that if Hardison proscribed all differences
in treatment among employees, then the decision would preclude all accommodation and
defeat the purpose of § 2000e(j). Id. at 1470 n.14 (citing Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601
F.2d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 1979)).

277. See id. at 1470.
278. Id.
279. Id. (noting that unlike in Hardison,there was "no evidence that the proposed shiftscheduling arrangement would, in the end, have granted Opuku-Boateng a privilege or
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Boateng. 2 80 To support its holding, the court distinguished Opuku-Boateng
from two situations where an accommodation would, in fact, have a
significant discriminatory effect on coworkers sufficient to show
preferential treatment: first, where the coworkers' contractual rights would
be denied by accommodating Opuku-Boateng 28 1 and, second, where the
coworkers would be required to undertake Opuku-Boateng's potentially
hazardous work. 2 82 Since the impact on the coworkers did not relate to
scheduling rights guaranteed by a seniority system, any complaints or
lowering of morale among the other employees were not justified since
there was no preferential treatment of Opuku-Boateng over his
coworkers. 283 As the Ninth Circuit noted in an earlier case, "'[i]f relief
under Title VII can be denied merely because the majority group of
employees, who have not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it,
there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the Act is
directed."'' 284 The court thus seemed to find that an accommodation's
impact on coworker preferences was not legally significant in determining
285
whether an undue hardship existed.
III. STRIKING A BALANCE: OUTSIDE THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT CONTEXT, SHOULD A COWORKER'S FAVORED SCHEDULE
EVER MATTER?

Discrimination against the majority in favor of the religious employee
clearly troubled the Hardison court and was perhaps the largest reason for
its holding, despite the fact that the language of § 2000e(j) would seem to
require an accommodation to be balanced only against the hardship

impose more than a de minimis burden on other employees" (citing Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 85 (1977))); see WOLF ET AL., supra note 82, at 110 (noting
that "while Hardison protects coworkers from an infringement of their seniority rights, it
does not permit them to veto a religious accommodation merely because of generalized
disgruntlement").
280. See Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1470. The court compared this case to two cases
where it found that accommodating the religious employee would have resulted in
significant discriminatory impact.
It distinguished this case, where there were no
contractually established rights that would be violated as a result of accommodating OpukuBoateng, from Hardison, where collectively bargained seniority rights would have been
undermined. It also distinguished Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th
Cir. 1984), from the present case, noting that in Bhatia, accommodation would have required
coworkers to assume the plaintiff's share of potentially hazardous work. Opuku-Boateng, 95
F.3d at 1468 n.12; see also Kaminer, supra note 34, at 618-19.
281. Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1470.
282. Id. at 1468 n.12 (distinguishing Hardison and Bhatia from Opuku-Boateng and
noting that the absence of a collective bargaining agreement in this case may differentiate the
cases).
283. See id. at 1470; see also Kaminer, supra note 34, at 618.
284. Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir.
1978) (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 775 (1976)).
285. Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1468 ("It is less clear what type of impact on coworkers,
apart from a significant discriminatory impact, constitutes an undue hardship.").
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imposed on the employer. 286 Although the Hardison Court was rightly
concerned with the preferential treatment of religious employees over their
secular coworkers, ambiguity in the decision has led to confusion over
whether negative impact on coworkers' shift preferences amounts to
preferential treatment outside the context of a collective bargaining
agreement. 2 87 Due to this confusion, many courts have set the bar on what
constitutes preferential treatment very low, 2 88 effectively allowing an
employer to show minimal impact on coworkers to be relieved of its
2 89
accommodation obligation.
Judicial discomfort with requiring accommodations that cause negative
impact on other employees has made the interests of the coworkers a third
interest that must be balanced along with the interests of the religious
employee and the employer. 2 90 This "trilogy of interests" 29 1 approach has
become a typical method of balancing competing interests in these cases,
despite the fact that there is no language in the text of § 2000e(j), the
legislative history of the statute, or the EEOC guidelines to support giving
any weight to coworkers' interest. 29 2 Professor Karen Engle insightfully
noted the problem with including coworkers' interests in the balance when
she wrote,
Although Title VII is largely about balancing employer... and
employee interests, and section [2000e(j)] specifically calls for such a
balance through the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
language, the religious accommodation cases often upset that equation.
They do so when they weigh employees' interests against each other.
Once the interests of employees who do not require religious
accommodation are brought into the equation, it is difficult for courts to
require accommodation,
since all accommodation requires disparate
293
treatment.

This Part argues that although it seems attractive to give the interests of a
religious employee's coworkers weight in the balancing of interests, in fact
some level of unequal treatment is what was intended by the drafters of
§ 2000e(j) and it is exactly what is required if any meaning is to be given to
the provision.2 94 This Part, however, does not advocate for accommodation
286. See LARSON, supra note 123, § 56.03[3]; see also supra notes 122-31 and

accompanying text.
287. See supra Part II.A-B; see also WOLF ET AL., supra note 82, at 114-15.

288. See Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 19 ("The Supreme Court has not demanded much
in respect to undue hardship.").
289. See supra Part II.A; see also Prenkert & Magid, supra note 20, at 468-69, 481 ("The
Supreme Court interpreted Section [2000e(j)] to place a low evidentiary burden on
employers to satisfy the undue burden standard.").
290. See Engle, supra note 28, at 406-07; see also WOLF ET AL., supra note 82, at 115
("[C]ourts are reluctant to approve an accommodation that has a provable adverse impact
upon other employees.").
291. See Engle, supra note 28, at 394.
292. See supra Part I.A.
293. See Engle, supra note 28, at 405-06.
294. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
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without any regard to preferential treatment of religious employees over
other employees. Rather, it argues that impact on coworkers becomes
preferential treatment and an undue hardship on the employer when (1) it
manifests as a tangible economic burden on the employer or (2) it would
require the coworker to perform additional physically hazardous tasks,
constituting a severe discriminatory burden on the coworker. Any impact
on coworkers that does not interfere with their contractual rights is de
minimis, and not legally cognizable, until this point. This Part argues that,
to promote this standard, Congress should clarify that the Hardison holding
concerning preferential treatment 295 should only apply in the context of a
collective bargaining agreement. Outside that context, infringement on
coworkers' shift preferences must result in either economic cost to the
employer or cause another employee to take on additional hazardous work
to constitute an undue hardship.
The remainder of this Part outlines some of the problems that arise when
courts inject notions of fairness and neutrality into their religious
accommodation determinations and argues that such considerations should
be excluded from the religious accommodation balancing equation. To
support this assertion, Part III.B discusses § 2000e(j)'s legislative history
and the EEOC guidelines, which exclude any reference to coworker
preferences. This Part then proposes a framework that courts should
employ when faced with a religious accommodation that would negatively
impact coworkers. Finally, this Part details policy concerns in support of
the proposed framework.
A. Judicial Concern with the Unfairness ofAccommodations
Due to conflicting interpretations regarding what type of imposition on
coworkers amounts to preferential treatment, courts have been relatively
inconsistent when adjudicating failure-to-accommodate claims that hinge
on negative impact on coworkers' shift preferences. 296 Some courts,
employing societal notions of fairness, have placed emphasis on employee
unhappiness, 297 while others tend to require a showing of more than mere

unhappiness or a decrease in morale before determining that a negative
impact on coworkers amounts to preferential treatment and undue
298
hardship.
As Part II.A discussed, the Fifth Circuit seems to place excessive
emphasis on the lowering of morale and coworker unhappiness surrounding
a proposed accommodation. 29 9 Under the Fifth Circuit approach, even if
there is no financial cost to the employer, pointing to other employees'
unhappiness with the accommodation will virtually always relieve an

295. See supra Part II.A-B; see also note 191 and accompanying text.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See supra Part
See supra Part
See supra Part
See supra Part

I.A-B.
ILA; see also Silbiger, supra note 106, at 851-52.
II.B.
II.A. 1-3.
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employer of the duty to accommodate. 300 Finding preferential treatment
because an accommodation makes other employees unhappy thus lowers
the undue hardship standard to an almost unworkable level. 30 1
Additionally, since courts construing Title VII distinguish personal
preferences from religious beliefs, 302 it seems anomalous that courts are in
fact balancing personal preferences of employees on the same scale as the
needs of religious employees. Although the Fifth Circuit and courts
holding similarly cannot be faulted for their conclusions, as they were
attempting to interpret serious ambiguity in the Hardison decision, such
holdings demonstrate judicial skepticism of religion 30 3 and a reluctance to
require accommodation that would have even a minimal effect on the
30 4
religious employee's coworkers.
Including fairness concerns of an accommodation's impact on coworkers
may undermine the purpose of § 2000e(j) and systematically relieves
employers of the duty to accommodate whenever even the slightest impact
on coworkers may result.30 5 Furthermore, imposing societal notions of
fairness into the balancing of interests creates unpredictable results, 30 6
possibly dependent on a given judge's idea of equity, and can lead to a loss
of meaningful religious protection for a large portion of religious
observers, 30 7 an end result that was surely not intended by the drafters of
§ 2000e(j).
B. Statute, EEOC Guidelines, and Legislative History: No Requirement of
Considerationof Coworker Impact
Although it may appeal to judicial sensibilities to prohibit preferential
treatment of religious employees that disadvantages their coworkers, such
unequal treatment seems to be required by the plain language of
§ 2000e(j). 30 8 Although courts often point to the purpose of Title VII,
which is to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, as a justification for
not requiring an accommodation that negatively impacts coworkers, 30 9
religion is specifically treated differently than other protected classes under
Title VII. 3 10 While race, national origin, color, and gender require neutral

300. See supra Part II.A. 1-3.

301. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
302. See LARSON, supra note 123, § 54.05[4] (distinguishing personal preferences from
religious beliefs).
303. See Kaminer, supra note 34, at 631.
304. See WOLF ET AL., supra note 82, at 115.

305. See supra Part I1.A.2-3.
306. See supra Part II.A. 1, B. 1. Although the facts of these cases are remarkably similar,
their outcomes are quite different.
307. See Kaminer, supra note 34, at 631.
308. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Part I.B.
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treatment, Title VII requires employers to affirmatively
treat religion
3 11
differently, and even, to some extent, unequally.
The EEOC guidelines stand in sharp contrast to many courts' concern
with the treatment of coworkers and seem to endorse the exclusion of
coworkers' interests from the equation. 3 12 Nowhere in the guidelines'
discussion of employer hardship is the impact on coworkers even
3 13
mentioned.
Likewise, the legislative history of § 2000e(j) makes no reference to a
concern that some accommodations may infringe on the shift preferences of
other employees. 3 14 In fact, the legislative history seems to indicate that
impact on coworkers was considered a permissible method of
accommodation. 3 15 Instead of incorporating three interests into the balance,
the congressional discussion focuses on possible negative impact on only
the employer. 316 This demonstrates that Congress, rightly or wrongly, did
not contemplate that the coworkers' happiness and morale should be
balanced against the religious employee's right to an accommodation and
the employer's interest to be free from undue hardship. It is not the courts'
place to effectively rewrite the statute to incorporate coworkers' interests in
the religious accommodation balancing equation because Congress, for
whatever reason, omitted it as a consideration.
However, it would seem overly harsh, and perhaps not in the spirit of
Title VII, to require an employer to accommodate a religious employee
regardless of any burden it may place on the coworkers. 3 17 For example, an
employer demanding that an employee put his physical well-being in
danger to accommodate a religious coworker seems almost
incomprehensible.
Yet a strict adherence to the plain language of
§ 2000e(j) would seem to compel such a result. Courts and commentators,
however, agree that an employer is not required to go this far. 3 18 Lending
support to this assumption, the legislative history of the 1972 amendment to
Title VII emphasized the importance of flexibility and discretion in dealing
with religious accommodation. 319 These values require courts to have some
leeway in cases where although no financial cost to the employer would
result, an accommodation would cause a significant discriminatory effect on
other employees in the form of imposition on their physical safety.

311. See supra Part I.B; see also Jamar, supra note 25, at 742.
312. See LARSON, supra note 123, § 56.03[1].
313. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e) (2008); see also supra note 118.
314. See 118 CONG. REC. 705-06 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
315. See id. at 706 (noting that any problems arising from an accommodation that
required deviation from the employer's set schedule could typically be handled by an
employer's other employees).
316. See id.
317. This is the concern that the Ninth Circuit had in Bhatia v. Chevron US.A., 734 F.2d
1382 (9th Cir. 1984). See supra Part I.E.3.a.
318. See supra Part I.E.3.a.
319. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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C. ProposedFramework: Impact on Coworkers Becomes Preferential
Treatment When It Imposes an Economic Cost on the Employer or Involves
Taking On Additional Hazardous Work
Generally, courts should take into account impact on coworkers only
when a religious accommodation would infringe upon the coworkers'
rights-not merely their preferences-to have a certain schedule.
Employees who do not have a contractual right to a certain schedule have
no entitlement to their preferences and any expectation that they may have
regarding these preferences, although understandable, is not legally
cognizable. 320 Therefore, if the other employees have not been legally
burdened, an employer that has to readjust its schedules to accommodate a
religious employee cannot be said to have suffered an undue hardship on
the conduct of its business.
1. A Focused Approach: Framework for Analyzing an Accommodation
That Burdens Coworkers
At a certain point in exceptional cases, however, even if employees have
no contractual right to certain shift preferences, an impact on employee
preferences may become an undue hardship on the employer's business
conduct. 32 1 Examples of circumstances when this may occur are religious
accommodations that lead to a disruption in work routines, loss of valued or
specially skilled employees, or a decrease in efficiency. 3 22 When
coworkers' preferences are implicated, a decrease in morale among
coworkers should be insufficient to show an undue hardship unless that
decrease in morale (1) has an evincible economic effect on the operation of
the employer or (2) would actually require another employee to take on
additional potentially hazardous work.
The first alternative can be demonstrated by evidence that an
accommodation so severely lowers morale that it is, for instance, causing a
decrease in efficiency or would lead to a loss of valued employees. The
second alternative should be reserved for situations, such as the Bhatia
case, 323 where an accommodation would likely place other employees in
physical danger.
The evidentiary burden on an employer seeking to use impact on
coworkers as a means of demonstrating undue hardship should be quite
high. Employers must present a preponderance of evidence that either of
the two above results will occur if accommodation is required. Although an
320. It has been suggested that courts should distinguish between invasion of actual
rights, recognized by the law, and imposition of negative externalities, some of which should
be considered as too small or otherwise legally irrelevant, in order to promote a legal regime
committed to protection of individual liberties. Volokh, supra note 162, at 621.
321. Volokh notes that the legislature may constitutionally create preferential treatment
for religion even if there is a disproportionate cost imposed on other people or activities. See
id. at 607-08.
322. See Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978).
323. See supra Part I.E.3.a.
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employer need not actually endure the hardship if it is more than likely to
occur, 324 it should present evidence that affirmatively shows that it cannot
accommodate the religious employee without undue hardship as defined
above. An example of evidence that may demonstrate a likely result of
undue hardship is a tentative schedule that unambiguously shows that there
is no possible way to accommodate the employee's religious observances
while still meeting the employer's scheduling needs. 325 This proposal, if
adopted, would effectively overrule the Weber holding that even the mere
possibility of a burden on coworkers as a result of an accommodation is
326
sufficient to constitute an undue hardship.
2. Policy Concerns in Favor of Adopting the Proposed Framework
The framework outlined above is a more truthful interpretation of
§ 2000e(j) and yet is sufficiently flexible to provide protection for
employers and coworkers when a religious accommodation would result in
preferential treatment that is significantly discriminatory towards other
employees.
Without placing emphasis on coworkers' happiness, the
framework sufficiently protects coworkers' interest to be free from
preferential treatment. When an accommodation becomes significantly
discriminatory, a lowering of morale will often create an economic effect on
the employer, such as a decrease in efficiency, which would release the
employer from its accommodation obligation.
Although courts are rightly concerned with preferential treatment of
religious employees over their coworkers, they seem to have forgotten that
because the statute mandates accommodation, religious employees in need
of accommodation will necessarily have a benefit that their coworkers do
327
not enjoy. Whether that benefit involves not working certain shifts,
3
2
having facial hair when an employer's dress code forbids it, 8 or not
attending devotional services required by a Christian-faith-operated
employer, 329 the fact that an accommodation is given to some employees
and not others already confers a benefit unequally based on religion. By
focusing too heavily on the unequal treatment of employees, courts have
essentially made it impossible for any accommodation not to constitute an

324. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.

325. The preparation of a tentative schedule was proposed by the Ninth Circuit as a
method of determining whether a speculative hardship would in fact occur. See OpukuBoateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1996).
326. See supra Part II.A.3.
327. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.1.

328. See supra Part I.E.3.a. Although the court ultimately found that allowing Bhatia to
keep his beard would be an undue hardship because it would require other employees to take
on his share of potentially hazardous work, the court noted that the employer made other
employees, who had no religious reason for their facial hair; shave their beards months
before Bhatia was ultimately terminated. Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382,
1383 (9th Cir. 1984).
329. See EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).
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undue burden, ignoring the fact that an accommodation, by its nature,
requires a certain level of unequal treatment.
CONCLUSION

Accommodation of a religious employee requires a balancing of
interests. Although § 2000e(j) seems to only require attention to the
interests of the religious employee and her employer, courts often inject the
interests of the religious employee's coworkers into the balance. Although
it is understandable that in the Title VII context courts are uneasy about
allowing a religious employee to be accommodated at the expense of her
coworkers, incorporating notions of fairness has led to uncertainty of
expectations about what sorts of accommodations are required. Therefore,
it seems beneficial to employ an adjudicative framework that takes into
account severe discriminatory treatment on coworkers yet still provides
adequate protection for the religious observer's needs. It may be argued
that this framework obviates any protection from serious, although not
severe, discriminatory treatment for the nonreligious employee. However,
an inquiry into the purpose, history, and legislative intent of § 2000e(j)
seems to compel at least a scaling back of the incorporation of coworkers'
interests into the religious accommodation balancing equation. Differential
treatment of religion-observing employees not only affords them equal
access to employment but also encourages integration and interaction
between religious groups in the workplace, a value that should be
paramount in our religiously diverse society.

Notes & Observations

